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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
AN EXAMINATION OF ACCOUNTING AND AUDITING ISSUES RELATED TO 
STRATEGIC ENVIRONMETNAL INITIATIVES 
by 
Barri Alexandra Litt 
Florida International University, 2011 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Kannan Raghunandan, Major Professor 
Although corporate environmental accountability is receiving unprecedented 
attention in the United States from policy makers, the capital market, and the public at 
large, extant research is limited in its examination of the implications of strategic 
corporate environmental initiatives on accounting and auditing.  The purpose of my 
dissertation is to address these implications by examining the association between firm 
environmental initiatives and audit fees, capital expenditures, and earnings quality using 
multivariate regression analysis.  I find that firms engaged in more strategic 
environmental initiatives tend to have significantly higher audit fees and capital 
expenditures, and significantly lower levels of earnings manipulation measured using  
discretionary accruals.  These results support the notion that auditors do recognize the 
importance of environmental initiatives when conducting the year-end financial statement 
audit, an idea that positively reflects upon the auditor’s monitoring role.  The results also 
demonstrate the increased amount of capital resources required to participate in strategic 
environmental initiatives, an anecdotal notion that had yet to be empirically supported.  
This empirical support provides valuable insights on how environmental initiatives 
vi 
 
materially impact corporate financial statements.  Finally, my results extend the extant 
literature by demonstrating that the superior financial performance reported by 
environmentally active firms is less likely driven by earnings manipulation by 
management, and by implication, more likely a result of real economic gains.  Taken 
together, my dissertation establishes a strong and timely foundation for current and future 
research to explore corporate environmental initiatives in the United States and globally, 
a topic increasingly gaining momentum in today’s more eco-conscious world.  
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AN EXAMINATION OF ACCOUNTING AND AUDITING ISSUES RELATED TO 
STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENTAL INITIATIVES 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Corporate social and environmental responsibility is receiving an unprecedented 
level of attention in the United States today relative to the past (Social Investment Forum 
2010).  Regulators, market participants, the media, and the public at large appear to be 
placing more value on environmental accountability, a trend that is certainly expected to 
continue given recent corporate environmental disasters such as the British Petroleum oil 
spill.  Authoritative bodies such as the Securities and Exchange Commission are 
undertaking considerable measures to enhance environmental disclosure and transparency 
(SEC 2010).  These environmental accountability initiatives accompany the enormous 
growth in socially and environmentally responsible investments over the past twenty 
years, which have grown from $639 billion in 1995 to over $3.07 trillion as of 2010 
(Social Investment Forum 2010).  Despite this pervasive focus on corporate 
environmental responsibility, extant literature is limited on the potential implications of 
firms’ participation in environmental initiatives on accounting and auditing.  In my 
dissertation, I address such implications by examining firms’ involvement in strategic 
environmental initiatives in various accounting and auditing contexts. 
My doctoral dissertation consists of three essays that examine accounting and 
auditing issues related to strategic environmental initiatives.  These issues examine 
environmental initiatives as they relate to audit fees, capital expenditures, and earnings 
management. 
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My first dissertation essay examines the association between firm environmental 
initiatives and audit fees, an established proxy for audit effort.  This examination is 
particularly timely, given the recent call by the President and Chief Executive Officer of 
the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants for the auditing profession to be 
more proactive on examining environmental issues (Melancon 2010).  By examining the 
impact of environmental initiatives on audit fees, I provide initial evidence on the extent 
of auditor consideration of such initiatives, which are of increasing regulatory, market, 
and public importance.  I find evidence that auditors do, in fact, appear to consider 
environmental initiatives in their audit pricing, thus supporting the notion that auditors 
are paying attention to the increasing importance of corporate environmental 
considerations.  I also report findings on how specific types of environmental initiatives 
relate to audit fees in order to add further insight to my analyses. 
In consideration of my first essay’s finding that auditors appear to consider 
environmental initiatives during the annual financial statement audit, a logical 
progression is to examine more specifically how these initiatives impact the corporate 
financial statements being audited.  I examine the impact of corporate strategic 
environmental initiatives on capital expenditures, a major financial statement component 
cited anecdotally as being heavily influenced by a firm’s investment in environmental 
initiatives (ChevronTexaco 2004; 2005; 2006; SEC 2010, Plank 2010; Mitchell 2010).  I 
provide the first empirical support for this association by investigating environmental 
initiatives as a potential determinant of capital expenditures.  My results indicate higher 
capital expenditures for firms with environmental initiatives, supporting the notion that 
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such initiatives require significant capital investment, which is reflected in the financial 
statements.  I also examine how specific types of environmental initiatives are related to 
capital expenditures. 
While my first two essays analyze the audit and financial reporting implications 
of environmental initiatives from the auditor’s and participating corporations 
perspectives, an area of significant  interest to the market is the quality of earnings 
reported by these corporations: this is the topic of my third dissertation essay.  Extant 
literature shows superior financial performance for firms with strong environmental 
performance (Bragdon and Marlin 1972; Spicer 1978; Douglas and Judge 1995; Guenster 
et al. 2006; Semenova and Hassel 2008).  However, several studies also find that firms 
reporting superior financial performance tend to engage in greater levels of earnings 
management, potentially overstating the level of actual economic gains attained 
(Burgstahler and Dichev 1997; Payne and Robb 2000; Dechow et al. 2000; Matsumoto 
2002; Das and Zhang 2003; Abarbanell and Lehavy 2003; Lin et al. 2008).  A natural 
question, then, is to what extent do firms engaged in environmental initiatives manage 
their earnings to report their aforementioned superior financial performance?  I provide 
insight into this question by examining strategic environmental initiatives as they relate to 
a firm’s propensity to manage earnings, as measured by performance-adjusted modified-
Jones model discretionary accruals (Kothari 2005).  My findings support lower levels of 
earnings management for firms involved in environmental initiatives, suggesting that the 
superior financial performance reported by these firms is more likely a result of real 
economic gains than of intentional earnings manipulation on the part of management.  I 
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also examine how specific environmental initiative types affect this association with 
earnings management. 
I organize the following dissertation by presenting each of these three essays in 
Chapter II, III, and IV, respectively.  I conclude with a discussion of the overall results 
and contributions of my dissertation in Chapter V. 
 
II. ENVIRONMENTAL INITIATIVES AND AUDIT FEES 
Amid increasing societal pressures, media attention and capital market interest, 
Congress and corporate regulators have gradually increased their focus on corporate 
environmental responsibility.  For example, the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) recently issued an environmental disclosure guideline to increase corporate 
America's accountability to stakeholders and is considering mandating such disclosures 
(SEC 2010).1  Developments of such guidelines complement the burgeoning stock market 
emphasis on socially and environmentally responsible investment funds and issuers.  
Over the past twenty years, there has been unprecedented growth in socially responsible 
mutual funds and market indices, with investments growing exponentially from $639 
                                                            
1 This SEC interpretive release entitled Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate 
Change more thoroughly outlines an organization’s responsibility to disclose existing and potential climate 
change effects on annual report items such as the description of business, risk factors, environmental capital 
expenditures, and legal and regulatory disclosures.  Compliance with this guideline is currently not 
mandatory although the SEC is considering introducing some mandatory disclosure requirements.  
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billion to $3.07 trillion between 1995 and 2010 (Social Investment Forum 2010).2  
Shareholders are even going so far as demanding companies to terminate their 
relationships with companies presenting high environmental risk (Allen et al. 2010).  The 
market’s focus on environmental issues suggests the need for more extensive and credible 
information about the implications of an issuer’s environmental initiatives.3 
To add credibility to a client’s environmental initiatives, the external financial 
statement independent auditors (hereafter auditor(s)) are considered one of the most 
appropriate assurance providers because they possess thorough understanding of the 
client including the internal and external environment, business strategies, controls and 
financial transactions, amongst other client aspects (Simnett et al. 2009a; 2009b).  
However, related evidence suggests auditors in the U.S. do not emphasize a client’s 
environmental initiatives (KPMG 2002; 2005).  The low rate of assurance in the U.S. is 
likely due to the lack of guidance in U.S. auditing standards (Simnett et al. 2009a; 2009b) 
and heightened litigation risk (Herda and Taylor 2010).  Even though investors are 
placing more emphasis on non-financial information related to corporate social 
responsibility (Dhaliwal et al. 2010a), prior research shows that auditors neglect and do 
                                                            
2 Organizations providing such mutual funds include Ariel Funds, Pax World Balanced Funds, New 
Alternatives Funds, and Green Century Funds; and indices include the KLD Index under the RiskMetrics 
Group and the Dow Jones Sustainability Index. 
3  I define environmental initiatives as strategic actions taken by a company that resonates with 
environmentally friendly characteristics such as reducing pollution and waste, using energy-efficient 
products and processes, recycling, using renewable energy and clean fuels.  A company's response to 
address an environmental violation standard (EPA) is not considered a strategic environmental initiative 
because the action was initiated by a regulator.  In additional analyses, I consider such environmental 
violations. 
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not place high priority on non-financial information in the performance of the audit (e.g., 
Hirst and Koonce 1996; Brazel et al. 2010; Trompeter and Wright 2010). 
However, this stance could take an unprecedented shift.  Recently, Barry 
Melancon, President and CEO of the AICPA recognized and called upon the profession 
to take a proactive role and increase attention to sustainability reporting and auditing.  
Mr. Melancon (2010, 5) proclaims that “it’s time for the social and environmental aspects 
of conducting business to be accounted for in the U.S.” and investors' increasing focus on 
sustainability and the financial implications of environmental initiatives are natural 
market forces demanding greater assurance from the auditors.  The development of 
reporting standards on green house gas emissions and the auditor’s potential role in 
providing assurance on such emissions (Simnett et al. 2009b) highlight the relevance and 
importance of environmental initiatives to the accounting profession. 
The potential role of the auditor in providing assurance over environmental 
initiatives is natural because environmental initiatives have potential material financial 
and reporting implications (Cho et al. 2006).  In its interpretive release on environmental 
issues, the SEC amplifies the operational and financial impact of environmental 
initiatives, citing specifically the significant effect such initiatives may have on capital 
expenditures (SEC 2010).  Evidence of such implications abounds in proxy statements.  
For example, ChevronTexaco Corporation’s Business and MD&A sections of the 10-K 
discuss that its environmental projects associated with increasing air and water quality 
required material investments of $145 million for environmental capital expenditures in 
2004.  The company’s environmental capital expenditures also grew significantly 
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between 2004 and 2006, from $213 million to $385 million, representing an 80% 
increase (ChevronTexaco 2004; 2005; 2006).  Such investment increases are congruent 
with escalating regulatory, societal and investor focus on corporate environmental 
responsibility and signify the material financial statement implications of environmental 
initiatives. 
However, the materiality of these costs increases the potential misreporting of 
environmental costs and the auditor’s ability to recognize this risk.  Because of the 
uncertainty and risks related to the outcomes of environmental initiatives, management 
may be motivated to deal with the associated operational and financial risks by 
manipulating the disclosure of outlays on environmental matters, particularly treating the 
outlays as capital rather than an expense.  Evidence suggests that capital expenditure is 
one of the riskiest accounts that has been subject to material restatements and financial 
fraud (e.g., Beasley et al. 1999; 2010; Maremont and Cohen 2002; Pulliam and Solomon 
2002; Audit Analytics Inc. 2008), and implies that auditors may have missed such 
misreporting. 
While it is clear that environmental initiatives appear to have material financial 
reporting and audit implications, there is no empirical evidence that auditors incorporate 
such initiatives in the audit of the financial statements.  Related evidence suggests 
otherwise.  Given the absence of empirical evidence, the heightened attention to 
environmental initiatives from Congress, regulators, society, and investors, and the 
unprecedented call for the accounting profession to take a more proactive role in such 
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issues, I provide the first empirical evidence of how environmental initiatives are related 
to the audit of the financial statements. 
Specifically, I address three research questions.  First, I examine the extent to 
which auditors consider environmental initiatives when conducting the annual financial 
statement audit.  I articulate theoretical propositions that suggest auditors may either 
ignore or incorporate environmental initiatives when performing the financial statement 
audit.  They may ignore environmental initiatives due to the lack of authoritative 
guidance on auditing environmental initiatives, the difficulty and lack of understanding of 
the economic and other implications of these initiatives, and because the initiatives are 
ambiguous.  Alternatively, auditors may give attention to and thus incorporate 
environmental initiatives because they relate to a client’s business risk and strategies, 
which they recognize have financial and audit implications, and regulators, investors, and 
other interested stakeholders that rely on audited information are placing more emphasis 
on environmental initiatives.  I empirically test such possibilities through the association 
between environmental initiatives and audit fees. 
My second research question probes further into any association between 
environmental initiatives and audit fees to facilitate understanding how types of 
environmental initiatives are related to the audit.  This is an important issue because 
environmental initiatives can have varying financial reporting implications.  Some 
initiatives may have significant financial implications while others may have relatively 
less material implications.  For instance, initiatives related to pollution prevention may 
demand relatively greater economic resources such as material expenditures to modify or 
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implement new technology, while recycling efforts may require more of a change in 
culture rather than significant investments in capital items.  I empirically address this 
question by relating five specific types of environmental initiatives to audit fees.   
My final research question examines the audit implications of investments in 
environmental initiatives captured in capital expenditures.  I focus on capital expenditures 
as a component of the financial statements and examine if the association between 
environmental initiatives and audit fees is conditional on capital expenditures.  Because 
prior audit fee research has not examined how capital expenditures are related to audit 
fees, nor has prior environmental research examined how environmental initiatives are 
related to such items in the financial statements, I rely on regulatory guidelines and 
anecdotes in an attempt to develop theoretical propositions on the conditional effect of 
capital expenditures on the association between environmental initiatives and audit fees.4  
The SEC believes that meeting certain environmental initiatives would require significant 
capital investments.  Anecdotes from proxy statements also suggest capital expenditure 
implications from environmental initiatives, but I do not expect all initiatives to have the 
same capital expenditure implications.  I empirically examine these capital expenditure 
implications in my second dissertation study. 
Based on a sample of 2,474 firm observations from 2004 to 2006 and after 
controlling for other determinants of audit fees, I find a significant positive association 
                                                            
4  Other financial avenues through which environmental initiatives could influence the audit is through 
asset impairment (e.g., equipment does not meet environmental standards and thus needs to be replaced), 
provisions for obsolescence of inventory that may not comply with environmental standards, cost of 
environmental cleanup or rectification, and lawsuits and related contingent liability.  I am unable to 
empirically test these due to the lack of adequate publicly available data. 
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between environmental initiatives and audit fees.  I also find that audit fees are most 
significantly related to initiatives regarding the use and/or development of 
environmentally beneficial goods and services, the implementation of strong pollution 
prevention programs, and a superior commitment to management systems, voluntary 
programs, and other environmentally proactive activities.  In addition, I find that the 
association between environmental initiatives and audit fees is more pronounced when 
capital expenditures are increasing.  In further tests, I find that firms with environmental 
initiatives pay abnormally high audit fees.  My results are robust to a number of 
additional tests including partitioning by firm size and environmentally sensitive 
industries, yearly analyses, potential endogeneity threats, additional control variables, and 
sensitivity to firms registered with the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) on Corporate 
Sustainability Reporting.  
Overall, my results support the assertion that auditors appear to consider a client’s 
environmental initiatives in the audit of the financial statements.  Assuming that higher 
audit fees represent greater audit effort (e.g., Davis et al. 1993; O’Keefe et al. 1994; 
Schelleman and Knechel 2010), my results suggest that auditors recognize and evaluate 
the financial statement implications of environmental initiatives.  Moreover, my results 
suggest that the extent to which auditors consider environmental initiatives varies 
according to the types of initiatives and the level of capital expenditures.  These findings 
suggest that auditors are aware of the differential financial implications of environmental 
initiatives when performing the audit.  An important contribution of my study is that I 
extend the understanding of how strategic initiatives, not previously examined, influence 
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financial reporting and the assurance function.  Generally, my findings suggest that 
auditors appear to recognize the increased attention various stakeholders are giving to 
environmental issues, and the financial implications of clients’ strategic environmental 
initiatives.  I complement Simnett et al. (2009a) who examine the choice of assurance 
providers to a client’s stand alone CSR reports.  Stand alone CSR reports are voluntary 
and are not part of the audited financial statements.  I develop and test hypotheses that 
examine the implications of environmental initiatives, a sub-set of CSR activities, on the 
performance of the external financial statement audit.  My results also suggest that future 
audit fee research may want to consider environmental initiatives and how they manifest 
in financial reporting when modeling determinants of audit fees because we are in an era 
of environmental focus characterized by Congressional, regulatory, societal, and capital 
markets emphasis on such issues, and the call for the accounting profession to respond 
accordingly. 
The remainder of this essay progresses as follows.  First, I review relevant extant 
literature.  I, then discuss the sample and empirical model, present my primary and 
addition analyses results, and finally conclude the paper. 
Background and Prior Literature 
Research and theory relating environmental initiatives to the performance of the 
external audit is virtually non-existent.  I, therefore, first review studies that examine the 
association between financial performance and environmental performance to provide a 
backdrop to the potential association between environmental initiatives and audit fees. 
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Environmental Performance and Financial Performance 
Although corporate environmental performance in the U.S. has not historically 
received strong emphasis as in other developed nations, the prior literature does support 
its relation to firm financial performance.  Albeit limited, I focus on the U.S. literature as 
these are the most relevant to my study.5  As early as 1972, accounting research in the 
U.S. documented a positive association between environmental performance and 
financial performance in the pulp and paper industry.  Bragdon and Marlin (1972) and 
subsequently Spicer’s (1978) empirical archival results showed that firms with better 
environmental pollution-control devices tended to be larger, more profitable, and have 
higher price-to-earnings and return on capital ratios. 
In the more recent empirical archival studies, the environmental preparedness and 
performance of firms are significant and positively associated with accounting-based 
operational and financial performance measures such as return on assets and Tobin’s q 
(Guenster et al. 2006; Semenova and Hassel 2008).  As detailed comprehensive data on 
environmental performance or initiatives is not readily available from public sources, 
Douglas and Judge (1995) utilize a survey questionnaire method.  Responses from U.S. 
environmental managers indicated that firms with a greater amount of resources and 
functionality committed to the natural environment experience greater success at 
integrating environmental issues into the strategic planning process and exhibit superior 
environmental and financial performance.  Collectively, these studies support a link 
between environmental initiatives and financial performance, which underscores the 
                                                            
5  Refer to Balabanis et al. (1998), Cronin (2001), and Hill et al. (2007) for a review of selected studies in 
other countries.   
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impact environmental initiatives have on financial reporting.  The central premise of 
these studies is that firms undertake environmental initiatives and allocate resources to 
these initiatives to achieve their strategic objectives.  Because environmental initiatives 
potentially affect performance, which in turn is related to audit risk, effort, and audit fees 
(e.g., O’Keefe et al. 1994; Hay et al. 2006), it follows that environmental initiatives could 
affect the performance of the financial statement audit.  However, given the lack of 
authoritative guidance on auditing environmental initiatives, external auditors may have 
difficulty evaluating and auditing the financial implications and related economic 
consequences of environmental initiatives.6  Therefore, it is not clear the extent to which 
auditors would consider environmental initiatives when performing the financial 
statement audit. 
Hypotheses Development 
Environmental Initiatives and Audit Fees 
Dittenhoffer (1995) recommends external auditors be cognizant of potential 
financial statement implications of the environmental initiatives undertaken by a client.  
Dittenhoffer (1995) posits that environmental initiatives may have financial reporting 
valuation and disclosure implications but does not offer specific guidelines.  Watson and 
MacKay (2003) synthesize the literature on corporate environmental policy and audit 
                                                            
6  For instance, an environmental project that invests in theoretically more advanced pollution-control 
equipment may be difficult to audit because the actual performance outcome of the equipment is unknown.  
Such a project could also raise questions regarding the fair value and thus possible impairment of existing 
equipment and the need to evaluate the financial impact, accounting treatment, and disclosure of the 
project.  These are complex audit issues.  For a discussion of the complexity of auditing green-house gas 
emissions, see Simnett et al. (2009b). 
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considerations.  They describe the intensifying public and political emphasis on corporate 
environmental issues but highlight that management’s complete discretion over how they 
disclose information about environmental issues, due to the lack of a standard reporting 
system, has led to a “greenwashing” effect.  They recommend auditors should carefully 
evaluate managerial assertions about environmental initiatives and their financial 
implications. 
Auditors may give greater attention to environmental initiatives when performing 
the audit because of (i) increasing Congressional, regulatory, societal, capital market, and 
the accounting profession’s interest in environmental information (e.g., Simnett et al. 
2009a; Melancon 2010), and (ii) the impact environmental initiatives may have on 
management’s assertions relating to the financial statements.  Auditors could either 
perform additional audit work themselves or rely on the work of environmental auditors 
to the extent necessary.7  If auditors adopt either approach then the additional assurance 
work could manifest in a positive association between environmental initiatives and audit 
fees.8 
                                                            
7  Darnell et al. (2009) propose that firms with external, independent environmental auditors may be able to 
more legitimately signal to the market, regulators, and investors that they are strong environmental 
performers, potentially improving firm reputation and attractiveness to customers and financers.  Simnett et 
al. (2009b) suggest that financial statement auditors could rely on such experts to help them evaluate 
management’s assertions regarding environmental issues.  Currently, there is no data available to ascertain 
the extent to which financial statement auditors rely on the work of environmental auditors. 
8  I am aware through personal conversations with audit partners and managers of the Big 4 that an audit 
program on environmental issues is available and used on a case-by-case basis.  The extent of audit work 
performed on environmental issues is contingent on a client’s emphasis and activities relating to the natural 
environment. 
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Cho et al. (2009) and Simnett et al. (2009b) suggest that the MD&A section is one 
forum where management may discuss environmental initiatives, their outcomes, and 
financial implications.  Auditors are required by Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) 
118, Other Information in Documents Containing Audited Financial Statements to 
evaluate disclosures in the MD&A (AICPA 2006b).  Auditors are required to ensure the 
information in the MD&A is consistent with and reconciles with information in the 
financial statements.  The SAS 118 requirements suggest that auditors may incorporate 
environmental initiatives in the performance of the audit. 
Alternatively, auditors may not elevate the importance of environmental 
initiatives when auditing the financial statements because of the difficulty due to lack of 
authoritative guidance, experience, and training on auditing environmental initiatives and 
their consequences (Simnett et al. 2009a; 2009b).  Currently there are no statutory 
requirements or generally accepted verification standards in the U.S. that relate to the 
preparation, presentation, and verification of environmental or corporate social 
responsibility data.  Consequently, auditors may ignore such information.  If auditors 
choose to ignore environmental initiatives or consider them to be unimportant, I expect 
environmental initiatives to be unrelated to audit fees.   
A client risk perspective also suggests alternative relationships between 
environmental initiatives and audit fees.  Following SAS 109, Auditors are required to 
obtain an understanding of the nature of the client’s business, its business processes and 
environment, and industry to assess various risks including the risk of a material 
misstatement (AICPA 2006a).  Dittenhoffer (1995) and Simnett et al. (2009a; 2009b) 
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urge auditors to give greater consideration to environmental issues because they are 
integral to a client’s strategies, business processes, controls, and the external 
environment.  Auditors can incorporate environmental initiatives when developing their 
understanding of the client’s business and assessing client-related risks.  Generally, if 
management of firms with environmental initiatives is perceived as responsible corporate 
citizens then it is likely such moral behavior may be considered positively by the auditor.  
Moral behavior is a function of management integrity and the tone at the top (Schwartz et 
al. 2005).  Higher management integrity and ethical tone at the top may reduce the 
auditor’s assessment of client-related risks and audit effort, which may, ceteris paribus, 
manifest in lower audit fees (e.g., Carcello et al. 2002).  If, however, auditors perceive 
management is engaging in “greenwashing” then they may ignore environmental 
initiatives, raise doubts about management’s integrity and intentions, and/or consider the 
likelihood of management misreporting in other areas of the accounts.  The latter 
increased client risk possibility suggests that environmental initiatives may have an 
upward pressure on audit fees. 
Consider a second example where the auditor understands a client’s strategy of 
becoming more environmentally friendly.  A client may voluntarily embark on a program 
of using recycled raw materials and reducing waste in its manufacturing processes to 
achieve its strategy of becoming “green”.  Such a strategy may demand replacement 
and/or modification of current plant and equipment, changes in purchases and inventory 
processes, controls, and throughput and performance measures.  The environmental and 
account level risks and economic consequences of the preceding may be considered by 
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the auditor which could result in additional assurance work.  However, if the auditor is 
unclear on how to evaluate and assess the implications of the environmental initiatives 
either because of lack of guidance and expertise, or because management is unable to 
provide clear documentation, then the auditor may ignore the initiatives altogether, rely 
on the work of an expert, or perform alternative audit procedures.  Empirically, the 
alternative audit and financial reporting consequences of environmental initiatives 
suggest that it is not clear how the additional audit work related to environmental 
initiatives might bear out in audit fees.  The lack of prior evidence and alternative 
arguments relating environmental initiatives to audit fees suggest I propose a null 
hypothesis: 
H1: There is no association between environmental initiatives and audit fees. 
Types of Environmental Initiatives and Audit Fees 
As an extension to H1, I examine the association between the types of 
environmental initiatives and audit fees.  Currently, I am not aware of any clear 
guidelines or other documentation discussing how environmental initiatives differ and 
their financial and reporting implications.  Simnett at al. (2009b) argue that 
environmental issues are very complex and understanding their implications is difficult.  
As such, I do not specify hypotheses but seek to explore how different types of initiatives 
are related to the performance of the audit.  According to KLD Research & Analytics, 
Inc., firms may engage in a range of environmental initiatives that address pollution and 
climate issues, recycling, environmentally friendly products and services, and other 
initiatives (KLD 2006). 
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Relatively, pollution and climate related initiatives may demand greater economic 
resources because of the need to acquire new technology and modify existing facilities.  
Thus, the auditor may need to perform additional audit work to ensure that transactions 
related to such initiatives are properly accounted for.  Recycling initiatives, on the other 
hand, may not require significant financial resources but more of a cultural change.  
Hence, recycling programs are not expected to be positively related to audit fees.  
Environmental initiatives such as producing or selling environmentally friendly products 
and services may also require significant financial resources as the need for new 
technology, equipment, and purchase of appropriate production factors may be critical to 
the success of these initiatives.  In addition, the market success of such products and 
services due to competition and consumer choices could present greater business risks 
and even threaten the viability of the business as a going concern.  Thus, initiatives 
related to products and services are likely to exert upward pressure on audit fees.  Finally, 
initiatives classified as “other” include management commitment to developing 
environmentally friendly systems and programs, and other proactive initiatives.  Since it 
is not clear what these initiatives are or how management may use this category to justify 
their assertions that could be inappropriate, this category may present greater audit risk, 
and thus be positively associated with audit fees.  I explain these initiatives types in 
greater detail in the Variable sections to follow. 
Environmental Initiatives, Capital Expenditure, and Audit Fees 
Environmental initiatives undertaken by a firm require significant resources and 
management commitment.  These initiatives may require significant one-time and/or 
19 
 
ongoing financial investment.  For example, earlier I documented the material capital 
investments made by ChevronTexaco to achieve its environmental initiatives.  In the 
Appendix, I provide anecdotal examples of environmental initiatives from annual 
financial reports.  While it is relatively clear that environmental initiatives have financial 
statement implications through capital expenditures, which I empirically address in my 
second dissertation paper, there is no prior empirical evidence of how capital 
expenditures are related to audit fees.  My search and the comprehensive review of the 
audit fee literature by Hay et al. (2006) do not identify a single study that examines how 
capital expenditure is related to audit fees. 
Capital expenditure potentially presents an important audit item because it is often 
materially misstated as firms seek to enhance income by capitalizing operating expenses.  
High profile cases such as Tyco and WorldCom heightened the awareness of firms 
misreporting expenses as capital items (Maremont and Cohen 2002; Pulliam and 
Solomon 2002).  The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway 
Commission (COSO) report that that majority of asset valuation frauds are related to 
capitalizing items that should be expensed and urge auditors to give greater attention to 
this pervasive and material reporting problem (Beasley et al. 1999; 2010).  Audit 
Analytics Inc. (2008) identifies capital expenditure as one of the top six categories of 
restatements, and auditing and fraud textbooks (e.g., Arens et al. 2010; Wells 2008) are 
also beginning to rate capital expenditure as a high fraud risk account. 
The risk of a material misstatement with respect to capital expenditure is expected 
to increase when coupled with environmental initiatives.  This is so because as explained 
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earlier, often-times the outcomes and/or success of environmental initiatives is difficult to 
quantify and thus its environmental and economic consequences are not clear (Watson 
and MacKay 2003; Simnett et al. 2009b).  Environmental initiatives may require 
significant amounts of financial investment which could place pressure on management’s 
ability to meet earnings targets.  Under such circumstances, management may resort to 
intentionally capitalizing operating expenses when it may not be appropriate.  Given the 
ambiguity and risks surrounding the accounting treatment of expenditures related to 
environmental initiatives, I posit that relative to firms without environmental initiatives, 
firms with environmental initiatives may require greater audit scrutiny in increasing 
capital expenditure. 
H2: The positive association between environmental initiatives and audit fees, if 
any, is more pronounced when the level of capital expenditure is higher. 
Sample and Research Design 
Sample 
To proxy for a client’s environmental initiatives, I rely on the KLD Research & 
Analytics, Inc database to identify firms with environmental data.  KLD independently 
rates companies trading on U.S. stock exchanges with regard to their social performance 
across a range of dimensions, including the environment.9  The KLD database is widely 
used and considered highly reliable because the KLD analysts are independent of the 
companies being rated, the analysts use objective screening criteria to rate firms, the 
                                                            
9  Other dimensions of social performance data in KLD include community, diversity, employee relations, 
and human rights (KLD 2006). 
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ratings are applied consistently across companies, and a wide range of sources is used to 
obtain the data (Waddock and Graves 1997; Hillman and Keim 2001).10  This database, 
containing firm data as far back as 1991, has been increasingly used in the past several 
years in management and accounting research (e.g., Cho et al. 2006; Bartkus and 
Glassman 2008; Sharfman and Fernando 2008; Chen et al. 2008, Cho et al. 2009). 
I begin my data year in 2004 since KLD restructured some of its data in prior 
years thus affecting comparability.  My initial sample comprises 9,012 firm observations 
in calendar years 2004-2006.  I then obtain financial, fee, and corporate governance data 
for these observations from COMPUSTAT, Audit Analytics, and the Corporate Library 
databases, respectively.  After converging these databases with KLD, my sample reduces 
to 3,697 observations.  I exclude 12 financial firms based on two-digit standard industry 
classification (SIC = 60 to 69) and a further 1,211 observations without a December 31 
year-end because KLD gathers and codes environmental data on a calendar-year basis.  
This final criterion is critical because failure to match the data years correctly can lead to 
inaccuracies in the analyses.  My final sample comprises 2,474 firm observations with all 
the necessary data. 
Empirical Models and Variables 
I construct my audit fee model based on the audit-fee literature meta-analysis by 
Hay et al. (2006) and more recent audit fee studies (e.g., Ettredge et al. 2007; Kealey et 
al. 2007; Hogan and Wilkins 2008; Venkataraman et al. 2008; Vermeer et al. 2008; Hay 
and Knechel 2010).  For Hypothesis 1, I estimate Equation 1 to examine the association 
                                                            
10  KLD indicated through our discussions that most of the environmental data are sourced from a firm’s 
proxy statements such as the 10-K. 
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between environmental initiatives (ENV_IN) and audit fees.  For Hypothesis 2, I estimate 
Equation 2 that introduces the interaction term between environmental initiatives and 
capital expenditure.  The variables in my regression models are explained below.  All my 
regressions are performed on data winzorised at the 1 percent and 99 percent levels and 
the standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White 1980).11 
 
LNAUDFEE =  f {LNASSETS, IND_ES, SEGNUM, FOREIGN, INVAR, LOSS,  
LEV, BDSIZE, BDMTGS, BDINDEP, BIG4, LNNAS,  
ZSCORE, GROWTH, INITIAL, SPECIAL, ENV_IN, 
YEAR FIXED EFFECTS} (1) 
 
LNAUDFEE =  f {LNASSETS, IND_ES, SEGNUM, FOREIGN, INVAR, LOSS, 
LEV, BDSIZE, BDMTGS, BDINDEP, BIG4, LNNAS,  
ZSCORE, GROWTH, INITIAL, SPECIAL, EI_YN, 
LNCAPEX, EI_YN*LNCAPEX, YEAR FIXED 
EFFECTS} (2) 
 
Dependent Variable: Audit Fees 
Consistent with the prior audit fee literature, I use the natural logarithm of audit 
fees paid to the external auditor as my dependent variable (LNAUDFEE).  In additional 
analyses, I estimate an abnormal audit fee model to determine whether clients with 
environmental initiatives pay abnormally higher audit fees. 
Test Variable H1: Client Environmental Initiative 
The KLD database provides information on environmental initiatives undertaken 
by a firm.  For each of the five initiatives rated by KLD, a firm is designated a binary 
variable (1 if an initiative is reported, 0 otherwise) to indicate if the firm is involved in 
that specific environmental initiative.  I first analyze the effect of overall environmental 
                                                            
11  My results are consistent if I use non-winzorised data and estimate standard and robust OLS regressions. 
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initiatives (ENV_IN) which represents the sum of five different initiatives.  The sum 
measure has been widely used in prior research and represents the extent of 
environmental initiatives undertaken by a firm (e.g., Waddock and Graves 1997; Hillman 
and Keim 2001).12  To provide insight, I perform further analysis based on types of 
initiatives. 
The first initiative type relates to a company’s use and/or development of 
environmentally beneficial products or services, such as innovative remediation products 
and energy efficient processes (PROD_SERV).  The second applies to a company having 
notably strong pollution prevention programs, such as emissions and toxic-use reductions 
(POLL_PREV).  The third refers to a firm which is a substantial user of recycled 
materials, or is a major factor of the recycling industry itself (RECYCLE).  The fourth 
initiative type indicates that a company has demonstrated a commitment to climate-
friendly practices in order to reduce its impact on climate change and pollution; such 
measures include energy efficiency and the use of renewable energy and clean fuels 
(CLIMATE).  Finally, the fifth environmental initiative type in my data indicates a 
company’s superior commitment to management systems, voluntary programs, and other 
environmentally proactive activities (OTHER).  I note here that beginning the year 2006, 
KLD rated one additional environmental variable, ISO 14000 certification.  However, 
since my data covers 2004-2006, I exclude this variable from my primary analysis but 
perform a separate analysis for 2006 after including this additional variable. 
                                                            
12  Prior research equally ranks each component of the KLD environmental ratings because there is no 
theoretical basis for a ranking (Hillman and Keim 2001).  Accordingly, I do not attempt to rank the 
environmental initiatives. 
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Test Variable H2: Interaction of Environmental Initiative and Capital Expenditure 
For the test of Hypothesis 2, the interaction effect of environmental initiatives and 
capital expenditure on audit fees, I use the natural logarithm of capital expenditures 
(LNCAPEX) and a categorical environmental initiative variable (ENV_YN).  I obtain the 
capital expenditure for a firm in a given year from COMPUSTAT.  The categorical 
environmental initiative variable is determined by setting ENV_YN to 1 if KLD reports a 
firm has at least one environmental initiative, and 0 otherwise.  I then take the product of 
LNCAPEX and ENV_YN to derive the interaction term. 
Control Variables 
Based on the prior audit fee literature, I include variables determined to be 
significantly related to audit fees.13  I include firm size (LNASSETS = the natural 
logarithm of total assets), the number of business segments (SEGNUM), and foreign 
operations (FOREIGN = 1 if firm has foreign operations, and 0 otherwise) because the 
prior literature suggests firm complexity due to size, more business segments, and foreign 
operations are associated with higher audit fees.  I include leverage (LEV = ratio of total 
debt to total assets) because of greater assurance required for firms with more debt.  I 
include INVAR, LOSS, and ZSCORE because firms with greater inventory and accounts 
receivable in total assets, loss-generating firms, and firms in financial distress present 
higher risk and put an upward pressure on audit fees.  INVAR is calculated as the sum of 
inventory and accounts receivable standardized by total assets, LOSS equals 1 for firms 
                                                            
13  Some of my control variables also help address potential spurious effects as they could affect the 
likelihood of a firm engaging in environmental initiatives.  These variables include firm size, leverage, 
financial performance (loss, zscore), and board variables (see Tests for Endogeneity under the Additional 
Analyses section). 
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reporting a loss for the financial year, and 0 otherwise, and ZSCORE is the Zmijewski 
financial distress score.  Since the prior literature reports that firms with high growth 
present greater risk of internal control breakdowns and financial misreporting, I control 
for GROWTH (percentage growth in sales for the year).  The final firm financial variable 
I control for is special items (SPECIAL = special items scaled by total assets) because 
such items also present greater risk and require additional audit effort. 
I include three firm governance control variables because they are related to audit 
fees as follows (e.g., Carcello et al. 2002; Hay et al. 2006).  Firms with larger boards 
have access to greater resources and thus may be better able to reduce risks facing the 
firm.  However, larger boards can also lead to inefficient monitoring thus increasing 
risks.  Therefore, board size (BDSIZE = the number of directors on the board) can be 
positively or negatively related to audit fees.  I include board independence (BDINDEP is 
the proportion of independent directors on the board) because greater board independence 
reduces agency costs and the risk of misreporting.  Alternatively, independent directors 
may demand additional assurance from the auditor to protect their reputation.  Such 
effects suggest a positive or negative association between BDINDEP and audit fees.  My 
third governance variable is the number of board meetings (BDMTGS is the number of 
board meetings during the financial year) because boards that meet often are arguably 
more diligent in identifying and addressing problems, and interacting with the auditor.  
Thus, board meetings can be positively or negatively related to audit fees. 
I include three auditor-related variables, BIG4, LNNAS, and INITIAL.  I include 
a Big 4 auditor indicator variable because prior research shows that Big 4 audit firms 
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provide higher quality audits and also tend to charge higher fees (BIG 4 = 1 if auditor is a 
Big 4 firm, 0 otherwise).  I control for the level of non-audit fees (LNNAS = natural 
logarithm of the non-audit fees paid to the auditor) because firms may employ their 
auditor to conduct environmental audits or provide assurance on sustainability reports 
(Simnett et al. 2009a).  As these audits are voluntary and not part of the financial 
statement audit, the fees for such audits would be captured in non-audit fees.  I also 
include an indicator variable of a first year audit (INITIAL = 1 if auditor is in the initial 
year of the audit, and 0 otherwise) as audit fees in the initial year may be higher due to 
greater diligence required, or lower due to audit pricing to entice new clients.  My final 
control variable is IND_ES, a dichotomous variable capturing firms operating in an 
environmentally-sensitive industry as defined in Cho et al. (2006).  These industries 
include oil exploration, paper, chemical and allied products, pharmaceuticals, petroleum 
refining, and metals industries.  As my data is from 2004 to 2006, I include year fixed 
effects.  For efficient reference, the operational definition of the variables, their expected 
association with audit fees, and data sources are summarized in Table 1.  
Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics on environmental initiatives for the full 
sample and by environmentally sensitive industries and non-environmentally sensitive 
industries.  I present five categories of environmental initiatives and the total number of 
initiatives; the total represents the ENV_IN variable.  Of the total sample observations of 
2,474, there are 327 observations (13.2%) of environmental initiatives (ENV_IN).  The 
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majority of the initiatives relate to CLIMATE (n = 110) followed by PROD_SERV (n = 
67), OTHER (n = 57), POLL_PREV (n = 54), and RECYCLE (n = 39).  Not surprisingly, 
the proportion of environmental initiatives is greater across all categories in the 
environmentally sensitive industries, and all categories but one, CLIMATE, are 
significantly different. 
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics for my dependent and control variables 
for the full sample and by sub-samples of firms that have at least one environmental 
initiative (ENV_IN > 0) and those that do not have any environmental initiatives 
(ENV_IN = 0).  I find that the average audit fees are significantly (p < 0.01) higher for 
firms with at least one environmental initiative compared to firms without an 
environmental initiative.  I also find that capital expenditure is also significantly larger (p 
< 0.01) in the environmental initiative sub-sample.  Regarding my control variables, 
firms with at least one environmental initiative appear to be significantly larger and less 
leveraged.  On average, these firms have less negative Z-scores, greater number of 
business segments, and a higher propensity to operate in an environmentally sensitive 
industry, and in foreign markets.  Firms with at least one environmental initiative also 
have boards that are larger, more independent, and meet more frequently.  Finally, with 
regard to audit variables, a greater (lower) proportion of firms engaging in environmental 
initiatives have a Big 4 auditor (initial audit) and these firms also procure more non-audit 
services from the auditor.  All of the differences above are highly significant (p < 0.01) 
and suggest that characteristics of firms with at least one environmental initiative vary 
significantly from firms without an environmental initiative. 
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Multivariate Analyses 
Table 4 reports Pearson and Spearman correlation matrices for the independent 
variables.  One correlation, between LNASSETS and LNCAPEX, is significant and large 
(0.86) but is not surprising because capital expenditure is a material component of assets.  
However, there is no multicollinearity threat from this association because when I include 
both these variables in my capital expenditure interaction tests, LNASSETS is based on 
the value of total assets after excluding capital expenditures.  The Pearson (Spearman) 
correlation between LNCAPEX and LNASSETS excluding capital expenditures is -0.51 
(-0.53).  All other correlations are below multicollinearity threat thresholds, the highest 
correlation being 0.58 between LNASSETS and LNNAS.  All of the reported and 
untabulated variance-inflation-factors (VIF) are below the threshold of 10, beyond which 
multi-collinearity may be a problem (Kennedy 1992). 
Table 5 presents the results for the regression of audit fees on the controls and my 
test variable, ENV_IN.  The results for the control variables indicate that LNASSETS, 
SEGNUM, FOREIGN, INVAR, LEV, BDMTGS, BDINDEP, BIG4, LNNAS, ZSCORE, 
and SPECIAL are positive and significantly associated with LNAUDFEE.  INITIAL and 
GROWTH are negatively associated with LNAUDFEE.  I find that IND_ES is negatively 
associated with LNAUDFEE suggesting that firms in environmentally sensitive 
industries pay relatively less audit fees than firms not in such industries.  This is probably 
because of special regulatory scrutiny (e.g., EPA) of firms in environmentally sensitive 
industries.  Most importantly, the results indicate a highly significant positive association 
between my test variable, ENV_IN, and LNAUDFEE.  Hypothesis 1 is therefore rejected.  
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This finding suggests that environmental initiatives affect the performance of the audit in 
that auditors appear to consider environmental initiatives in the audit of the financial 
statements.  By expending additional effort, auditors may be providing assurance over a 
client’s assertions regarding environmental initiatives and how they affect the financial 
statements.  This finding supports the profession’s recognition of increased market 
reliance on environmental information when making investment decisions and the need 
for auditors to modify year-end audit work accordingly.  
Table 6 presents my examination of an environmental initiative variable that 
captures whether a firm is reported by KLD to have engaged in at least one 
environmental initiative (ENV_YN).  I find that ENV_YN is positive and significantly 
associated with LNAUDFEE (p = 0.000).  This finding suggests that even if a firm is 
involved in one environmental initiative, there are audit fee implications.  The control 
variable results are similar to those in Table 5.  
Also in Table 6, I present evidence of how each type of environmental initiative is 
related to audit fees.  I find that three types of environmental initiatives, PROD_SERV, 
POLL_PREV, and OTHER are positive and significantly associated with LNAUDFEE.  
These findings suggest that the positive association between audit fees and environmental 
initiatives is largely driven by initiatives involving the use and/or development of 
environmentally beneficial goods and services (PROD_SERV), the implementation of 
strong pollution prevention programs (POLL_PREV), and a superior commitment to 
management systems, voluntary programs, and other environmentally proactive activities 
(OTHER). 
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An analysis of the economic or practical significance of the types of 
environmental initiatives suggests that the statistically significant initiatives, 
environmentally-friendly products and services, pollution prevention, and other 
environmentally proactive systems, programs, and activities, will incur on average 
additional audit fees of approximately $373,000, $505,000 and $421,000 compared to 
firms that do not have these initiatives.  However, if a firm has at least one initiative, 
regardless of what type it is, then the impact on audit fees is not cumulative.  Our dummy 
variable results (ENV_YN) suggest that audit fees are higher on average by about 
$357,000 for firms with an initiative compared to firms without any initiative.  To 
complement this, I also analyze the economic importance of the continuous measure of 
environmental initiative participation (ENV_IN).  The analysis here suggests that when 
there is a one unit (one standard deviation) change in the natural logarithm of 
environmental initiatives, audit fees increases by about 11%.  Based on the average audit 
fee, this suggests that audit fees would increase by about $212,000.  Overall, these 
analyses suggest that environmental initiatives are economically important determinants 
of audit fees 
Results for the test of H2 are presented in Table 7.  I present two regression 
results.  The first regression includes the environmental initiative variable that captures 
whether a firm is reported by KLD to have engaged in at least one environmental 
initiative (ENV_YN),14 and capital expenditures (LNCAPEX = natural logarithm of 
                                                            
14  I employ a binary variable instead of a continuous variable when performing the interaction test related 
to H2 because Aiken and West (1991) recommend doing so minimizes statistical problems such as 
multicollinearity and enables better interpretability of interaction effects. 
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capital expenditures).  I modify the firm size variable (LNASSETS) to exclude capital 
expenditures.  In the second regression, I introduce the interaction term, 
ENV_YN*LNCAPEX. 
The first regression shows that both ENV_YN and LNCAPEX are positive and 
significantly associated with LNAUDFEE (p = 0.000).  In the second regression I 
observe the interaction term, ENV_YN*LNCAPEX, is also positive and significantly 
associated with LNAUDFEE (p = 0.000).  This result is consistent with H2 and suggests 
that audit fees are increasing in firms with environmental initiatives and greater level of 
capital expenditure.  I also perform interaction tests for each type of environmental 
initiative and find significant positive interactions for PROD_SERV (p = 0.000), 
POLL_PREV (p = 0.089), and CLIMATE (p = 0.000). 
Additional Tests 
Firm Size 
I test the sensitivity of my primary results to client size as larger firms are more 
visible and thus subject to greater scrutiny and pressure to implement environmental 
initiatives.  Larger firms also have potentially more resources to invest in environmental 
initiatives.  I partition my sample into small and large firms based on the median of 
LNASSETS as my cutoff (large firms > median).  For the large firm subsample, ENV_IN 
is significant at the five percent level, and for the small firm subsample, ENV_IN is 
significant at the ten percent level.  When I perform this size sensitivity analysis by 
initiative type, my results are consistent with those in Table 6 for large firms.  For smaller 
firms, I find that only CLIMATE is significant (p < 0.01).  For the test of H2, I find the 
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interaction term EI_YN*LNCAPEX is significant for small firms only.  The 
insignificance for large firms could be due to little variability in their capital expenditure 
and environmental initiatives because large firms are more visible and subject to greater 
market and regulatory scrutiny. 
Environmentally Sensitive Industries 
In order to examine the sensitivity of my results to environmentally sensitive 
industries, I partition my sample into firms operating in and not operating in such 
industries.  This is an important additional test because my descriptive statistics in Table 
2 show that environmental initiatives differ between environmentally sensitive and non-
sensitive industries.  My untabulated results of re-estimating Equation (1) for both sets of 
firms show that ENV_IN is positive and significantly (p < 0.05) associated with 
LNAUDFEE for both sets of firms.  I find similar results for the types of environmental 
initiatives with the following exceptions: CLIMATE is significant for environmentally-
sensitive firms, and PROD_SERV is not significant for non-environmentally sensitive 
firms.  The former result is not surprising because environmentally sensitive firms face 
greater scrutiny over climate-related issues of which the auditor is cognizant whereas for 
non-environmentally sensitive firms, it appears that the development of environmentally 
beneficial products and services may not have material financial statement implications.  
When I reperform the test of H2 for environmentally sensitive and non-sensitive 
industries separately, I obtain results consistent with those reported in Table 7. 
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Yearly Analyses 
I test the sensitivity of my primary results to the financial year examined.  As 
previously noted, my sample covers years 2004 to 2006.  I conduct my regression 
analysis for each year individually and find results consistent with my earlier results.  
Obtaining the same results between my pooled and yearly analyses suggests regression 
bias in my panel data is negligible.  In my primary tests, I excluded an additional 
environmental initiative variable, ISO 14000 certification, that KLD began rating in 
2006.  When I re-estimate my equations for the entire sample and only for 2006 after 
including this additional environmental variable, I find results consistent with those in 
Tables 5, 6, and 7.  In the environmental type analysis as per Table 6, I find this variable 
is positive and significantly related to audit fees (p < 0.01). 
Abnormally High Audit Fee 
In order to examine if firms engaging in environmental initiatives pay abnormally 
high audit fees, I first exclude the environmental variables from my primary audit fee 
model (Equation 1) and estimate the audit fee model to obtain the residuals.  Residuals 
from audit fee models have been used to proxy for abnormally high audit fees (e.g., 
DeFond et al. 2002).  I then regress these residuals on the environmental initiative 
variables in order to assess if firms with environmental initiatives are associated with 
greater than expected annual audit fees.  In untabulated results, I observe ENV_IN is 
positive and significantly associated with the audit fee residuals (p = 0.000).  When I 
repeat the analysis for each type of environmental initiative, I find results consistent with 
those in Table 6.  I obtain similar results when I repeat the interaction test in Table 7 
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using abnormal audit fees as the dependent variable.  These results are consistent with, 
and complement my primary findings. 
Test for Endogeneity 
In order to rule out concerns of potential endogeneity between environmental 
initiatives and audit fees, I perform the Hausman test (Hausman 1978; Kennedy 1992).  
The first procedure of my test requires the estimation of a model for determinants of 
environmental initiatives (ENV_IN).  Calling upon several studies in this limited research 
area, I include the following potential explanatory variables: size (natural logarithm of 
total assets) (Spicer 1978; Guenster et al. 2006; Clarkson et al. 2008); leverage (total debt 
to total assets) (Clarkson et al. 2008); environmentally sensitive industry membership 
(Cho et al. 2006); board characteristics (size, percentage of independent directors, and 
meeting frequency) (Kassinis and Vafeas 2002; Webb 2004); profitability (return on 
assets) (Spicer 1978; Guenster et al. 2006; Clarkson et al. 2008); duality (CEO is the 
chair of the board) (Webb 2004); the percentage of institutional ownership (Mahoney and 
Roberts 2007); and finally, the number of environmental concerns.  KLD reports 
dichotomous data on firm environmental concerns, which I use to derive an 
environmental concern test variable.15  While this last variable has not been examined in 
the prior environmental literature, I believe that the presence of an environmental concern 
(e.g., oil spill) will increase the firm’s need to address such concerns and others through 
                                                            
15 The six environmental concerns are firms: having large hazard waste liabilities or violations of waste 
management regulations, having violations of air, water, or other environmental regulations, being 
identified as one of the top manufacturers of ozone-depleting chemicals, having high legal levels of toxic 
chemical emissions into the air and water, being identified as a substantial producer of agricultural 
chemicals, having substantial direct or indirect revenues from the sale or combustion of coal or oil and its 
derivative fuel products, and having involvement in any other environmental controversy (KLD 2006). 
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the implementation of environmental initiatives.  From the estimate of this environmental 
initiative model, I use the resulting residuals as an explanatory variable in the audit fee 
model.  Since the residual is not statistically significant (p > 0.10) in the audit fee model, 
there is no evidence to suggest potential endogeneity problems (Kennedy 1992). 
Potentially Omitted Variables 
In my tests I have sought to maintain parsimony, but a downside is the omission 
of potentially omitted variables.  I perform additional tests to consider potentially omitted 
explanatory variables.  I include the presence of an internal control weakness since my 
data is post-Section 404 (Raghunandan and Rama 2006; Hogan and Wilkins 2008; 
Hoitash et al. 2008; Mitra 2009), duality (CEO is the chair of the board) (Muniandy 
2007; Mitra et al. 2007; Boo and Sharma 2008), presence of a merger or acquisition 
within the financial year (Hogan and Wilkins 2008; Hoitash et al. 2008; Ghosh and 
Pawlewicz 2009), institutional ownership (Hay et al. 2006; Mitra et al. 2007; Hay et al. 
2008; Han et al. 2009), and audit committee size and the presence of an accounting 
expert on the audit committee (e.g., CPA, CFO as defined in Dhaliwal et al. 2010b).  I 
find only internal control weakness (p < 0.01) and merger and acquisitions (p < 0.10) are 
significant.  More importantly, the inclusion of these additional control variables does not 
affect the results of my environmental initiative variables. 
I address next the effect of environmental concerns two ways; first by including it 
as a control variable and second, by estimating my fee models only for companies that do 
not have any environmental concern.  KLD also provides data on whether a firm violates 
any environmental standard such those regulated by the EPA.  Firms that are subject to an 
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EPA citation may remediate the violation and also undertake other voluntary initiatives.  
When I include either the number of environmental concerns, types of concerns, or 
whether a firm is reported to have a concern either in the current or prior year, I find that 
none of these variables is statistically significant in any of my audit fee tests.  More 
importantly, I find my environmental initiative variables remain statistically significant.  
My results are consistent when I exclude firms with an environmental concern and re-
estimate the audit fee regressions.16 
Finally, I consider the effect of the presence of companies in my sample that are 
registered with the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI).  U.S. companies part of the GRI 
issue a standalone corporate sustainability report that may or may not be assured (Simnett 
et al. 2009a).  These firms are more likely to engage in environmental initiatives and thus 
their presence in the sample could affect my results.  I conduct two tests to evaluate the 
effects of GRI companies in my sample.17  First, I include a control variable for GRI 
which is equal to 1 for firms in the GRI, and 0 otherwise.  Second, I exclude these 
companies from the sample and re-perform all my tests.  My results are not affected when 
I consider GRI companies.  I do find that the GRI control variable is positively associated 
with audit fees.  This observation resonates my results regarding the association between 
environmental initiatives and audit fees. 
 
 
                                                            
16  The sample size for tests excluding companies with an environmental concern is 1,928. 
17  My sample comprises 119 (4.8%) observations in the GRI. 
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Conclusion 
Companies are responding to mounting pressures and interest in environmental 
accountability from a range of stakeholders including Congress, regulators, society, 
investors and more recently, the accounting profession.  To appease these stakeholders, 
management of companies has responded by investing in environmental initiatives and 
providing related disclosures in the MD&A and other sections of the annual report (Form 
10-K).  However, the credibility of environmental disclosures has been questioned (e.g., 
Cho et al. 2009) and some suggest that the external auditor can enhance management’s 
assertions regarding environmental disclosures and their implications on the financial 
statements (Simnett et al. 2009a).  While it appears that auditors do not seem to assure the 
credibility of such disclosures, recent research and the profession has called for greater 
auditor involvement because auditors are experienced assurance providers (Simnett et al. 
2009a; 2009b; Melancon 2010). 
This study provides the first empirical evidence of the auditor’s potential 
involvement in providing assurance over a client’s assertions regarding the implications 
of environmental initiatives on reported financial information by examining the 
association between environmental initiatives and audit fees.  If auditors consider the 
need for additional assurance work in order to substantiate assertions clients make about 
environmental initiatives and their impact on the financial statements, I would anticipate 
a positive association between environmental initiatives and audit fees.  A result to the 
contrary may suggest auditors consider environmental initiatives are not material to 
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warrant additional assurance, they may lack the expertise to do so, or it is difficult to 
evaluate the initiatives and their economic and financial implications. 
My results suggest auditors appear to consider client environmental initiatives 
when performing the annual financial statement audit.  I find that this association is 
driven by environmental initiatives regarding the use and/or development of 
environmentally beneficial goods and services, the implementation of strong pollution 
prevention programs, and a superior commitment to management systems, voluntary 
programs, and other environmentally proactive activities.  My results imply that these 
environmental initiatives may require material financial resources that have financial 
reporting implications.  Regulation of climate related initiatives by authoritative agencies 
such as the EPA could explain the non-significant finding for this variable.  Recycling 
initiatives could be considered not financially material as this may not require significant 
investment in resources but more of a corporate cultural change.  Future research with 
more specific data using both empirical archival and survey methods could provide more 
definitive interpretation of my results.  Nevertheless, my results imply that auditors 
appear to recognize the increased market reliance on corporate environmental 
information and the demand this places on the annual financial statement audit. 
An interesting finding is that audit fees are increasing for clients with an 
environmental initiative and higher capital expenditure.  By documenting this conditional 
effect, I provide empirical evidence that extends our understanding of the implications of 
a client’s strategic orientation on the financial statements and the production of the audit.  
Very little research, if any, has investigated how a client’s strategy is related to audit fees 
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(Allen et al. 2006).  In this context, my specific findings show that environmental 
initiatives as a business strategy demands resources which have financial reporting 
implications (e.g., need for financing, capitalizing or expensing outlays).  I examine this 
notion specifically in my second dissertation paper.  My findings are also consistent with 
capital expenditure being a high risk account and the potential for management to engage 
in “greenwashing” environmental information.  Taken together, my results suggest 
auditors appear to be cognizant of such risks. 
Some potential limitations of my study provide opportunities for future research.  
First, my environmental initiative data does not provide information on the likely success 
of the initiative, nor does it capture the extent of the financial investment related to a 
particular initiative.  Such information, however, would be made available to auditors, as 
they would need specific information to evaluate management’s assertions regarding 
these initiatives.  The availability of such data would provide greater analytical and 
inferential insight on how environmental initiatives affect the audit.  Second, I do not 
examine whether auditors are able to identify “greenwashing” and how these influence 
the audit.  The experimental method may be more suited to such an examination.  Third, I 
do not examine the incentives facing management to engage in environmental initiatives 
and how these affect the association between initiatives and audit fees.  Fourth, as with 
any empirical examination, I can only provide evidence of an association but cannot 
make inferences with respect to causation.  Fifth, while my results are robust to a 
comprehensive set of control variables and additional tests, I cannot rule out the presence 
of other potential omitted correlated variables not yet uncovered in extant audit fee 
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literature.  Lastly, while this dissertation paper addresses environmental initiative 
implications for the auditor, many stakeholder perspectives may be examined, opening 
the door for much future research. 
 
III. ENVIRONMENTAL INITIATIVES AND CAPITAL EXPENDITURES 
This study provides initial and timely evidence on the association between a 
firm’s environmental initiatives and capital expenditures.  As I have discussed, the past 
twenty years have seen an unprecedented market growth in socially responsible mutual 
funds and market indices, with investments growing exponentially from $639 billion to 
$3.07 trillion between 1995 and 2010 (Social Investment Forum 2010).  These growth 
figures underscore the fact that investors are placing more emphasis on socially 
responsible companies.  Corporate regulators such as the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) parallel such market emphasis through their oversight activities, such 
as the aforementioned recent guideline issued on environmental disclosure aimed at 
ensuring investors receive adequate and transparent disclosure on a firm’s environmental 
activities and risk (SEC 2010).  This guidance amplifies the operational and financial 
risks associated with environmental initiatives and specifically cites the significant effect 
such initiatives may have on capital expenditures (SEC 2010).  
However, we do not know if and how environmental initiatives are related to 
capital expenditures since there is no prior empirical research.  I fill this void in the 
literature and extend my knowledge about the financial implications of environmental 
initiatives.  Understanding the relationship between environmental initiatives and capital 
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expenditures is important for several reasons.  First, capital expenditures are pivotal to 
achieving corporate objectives and excess market returns (e.g., Tobin 1969; Yoshikawa 
1980; Hayashi 1982; Abel 1983).  In a climate where environmental initiatives are 
receiving heightened attention and attracting investment capital and government grants 
and subsidies, firms may tout their environmental strategies but fail to invest secured 
funding in such strategies.  Bohn reports that such fraudulent practices are on the increase 
with significant economic consequences for investors, lenders and the government 
(2010).  Examining the empirical relationship between environmental initiatives and 
capital expenditures could inform and help address such concerns. 
Second, since capital expenditures comprise a significant portion of a firm’s 
assets which are utilized to achieve its objectives, understanding the association between 
environmental initiatives and capital expenditures could advance our knowledge of how 
environmental initiatives are implemented by companies.  Often times, a firm’s growth is 
measured through growth in total assets, and knowing how environmental initiatives 
affect firm growth in an era of environmental concerns could assist investors and analysts 
in making more informed decisions. 
Third, because of the uncertainty related to the outcomes of environmental 
initiatives, management may be motivated to deal with the associated operational and 
financial risks by manipulating the disclosure of outlays on environmental matters, 
particularly treating the outlays as capital rather than an expense.  Capital expenditure is 
one of the riskiest accounts that has been subject to material restatements and financial 
fraud (e.g., Beasley 1999; 2010; Maremont and Cohen 2002; Pulliam and Solomon 2002; 
42 
 
Audit Analytics Inc. 2008).  Auditors, analysts, investors, and regulators can benefit from 
an understanding of how capital expenditures are influenced by environmental initiatives. 
In this study, I address two research questions.  First, I address the extent to which 
a firm’s environmental initiatives factor into its capital expenditure decisions.  I 
empirically test this by regressing capital expenditures on environmental initiatives.  My 
second research question facilitates understanding of how types of environmental 
initiatives are related to capital expenditures.  This is an important issue because 
environmental initiatives can vary in complexity and demand on financial resources.  I 
empirically address this question by regressing capital expenditures on five specific types 
of environmental initiatives.  
Using a sample of 2,164 observations from 2004 to 2006 and after controlling for 
other determinants of capital expenditures, I find a significant positive association 
between environmental initiatives and capital expenditures.  I also find this significant 
positive association persists across all five types of initiatives, but is strongest for 
initiatives related to recycling, climate, and other initiatives (management systems, 
voluntary programs, and other environmentally proactive activities).  In further tests, I 
find that firms with environmental initiatives have abnormally high capital expenditures.  
My results are also robust to a number of additional tests.  
Overall, my results are consistent with the assertion that firms undertaking 
environmental initiatives support such initiatives with increased investments in capital 
expenditures.  In addition to filling a gap in the literature, the findings can assist analysts, 
auditors, investors, regulators, and others interested in understanding the financial 
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implications of a firm’s environmental initiatives.  My results suggest that the economic 
impact of environmental initiatives on capital expenditures is not constant but varies 
according to the type of initiative.  My initial results present an opportunity to delve 
deeper and further into our understanding of why, how, and when environmental 
initiatives may have different financial implications.   
The remainder of this dissertation paper progresses as follows.  In the next 
section, I review pertinent extant literature.  I, then, discuss the sample and empirical 
model, followed by my primary and additional analyses results, and lastly, I conclude the 
paper. 
Background and Prior Literature 
I review two paradigms of pertinent literature to underpin potential associations 
between environmental initiatives and capital expenditures.  I first review studies that 
examine the association between environmental performance and financial performance, 
as I did for my first dissertation essay.  The purpose of this review is to provide some 
background and imply a link between environmental initiatives and capital expenditures.  
The second paradigm I review is the limited literature on the determinants of capital 
expenditure so that I can develop a baseline model and subsequently evaluate the 
contribution of environmental initiatives in explaining capital expenditures. 
Environmental Performance and Financial Performance 
Although environmental performance has not historically received the same level 
of attention in the U.S. than it has in other developed nations, prior U.S. studies do 
support a relation between corporate environmental performance and financial 
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performance.  I focus on the U.S. literature as these are the most relevant to my study.18  
As early as 1972, accounting research in the U.S. documented a positive association 
between environmental performance and financial performance in the pulp and paper 
industry.  Bragdon and Marlin (1972) and subsequently Spicer’s (1978) empirical 
archival results showed that firms with better environmental pollution-control devices 
tended to be larger, more profitable, have higher price-to-earnings and return on capital 
ratios.  These positive associations between firm environmental performance and 
favorable financial outcomes support the notion of a corporate incentive to invest in 
environmental capital expenditures as a means of producing stronger financial results. 
Douglas and Judge (1995) report survey responses from U.S. environmental 
managers that indicate firms with more resources functionality committed to the natural 
environment experience greater success at integrating environmental issues into the 
strategic planning process and, consequently, exhibit superior environmental and 
financial performance. 
More recent studies reveal that firms with greater environmental preparedness and 
performance are significantly and positively associated with higher levels of accounting-
based operational and financial performance measures such as return on assets and 
Tobin’s q (Guenster et al. 2006; Semenova and Hassel, 2008).  Collectively, the studies 
reviewed support a positive link between environmental initiatives and financial 
performance, which underscores a potential motivation for firms to increase capital 
investments in order to participate in such initiatives. 
                                                            
18  Refer to Balabanis et al. (1998), Cronin (2001), and Hill et al. (2007) for a review of selected studies in 
other countries.   
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Determinants of Capital Expenditures 
The motives for a firm’s capital investment decisions have been predominantly 
studied from a market perspective.  Achieving greater returns and firm valuations are the 
primary documented incentives for capital expenditures (Tobin 1969; Yoshikawa 1980; 
Hayashi 1982; Abel 1983).  Most recently and relevant to my work, some studies 
examine firm characteristics as potential determinants of various capital investment 
qualities, such as sensitivity and efficiency (Biddle and Hilary 2006; Hovakimian 2009; 
Biddle et al. 2009). 
Biddle and Hillary (2006) find that higher quality accounting enhances investment 
efficiency by reducing information asymmetry between management and independent 
capital suppliers, with this effect being stronger in economies with primarily arm’s length 
financing relative to countries where creditors supply more capital.  Hovakimian (2009) 
finds investment sensitivity varies due to financial constraints, cash flows, and growth 
opportunities.  Finally, Biddle et al. (2009) suggest that higher reporting quality improves 
investment efficiency by reducing friction, such as adverse selection and moral hazard, 
because higher financial reporting quality is associated with better access to external 
financing. 
Hypotheses Development 
Environmental Initiatives and Capital Expenditures 
A firm’s commitment to successfully undertaking environmental initiatives 
congruent with its strategic intent demands substantial investments in financial and non-
financial resources.  The resource demands span across the organization, from top 
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management to employee training and education, from systems development to policy 
implementation, from marketing research to product design and process reengineering, 
refitting and retooling production and service delivery equipment and buildings.  These 
resource demands suggest capital expenditures are an important and material item that 
could affect the outcomes of environmental initiatives.  Such an implication has been 
supported by both financial regulation and anecdotal evidence.  For example, the SEC’s 
recent environmental disclosure interpretation addressing climate change specifically 
cites the imperative for firms to consider the impact of its environmental initiatives on 
capital expenditures when constructing its financials and related disclosures (SEC 2010).  
Additionally, under Item 101 of Regulation S-K, material current and future capital 
expenditures made for environmental controls over greenhouse gas emissions are 
required to be considered and disclosed. 
My search of the business press and proxy statements filed with the SEC provides 
anecdotal evidence supporting the capital expenditure implications of environmental 
initiatives.  For example, ChevronTexaco Corporation’s Business and MD&A sections of 
the 10-K discuss that its environmental projects associated with increasing air and water 
quality required financially material capital expenditures of $145 million in 2004 
(ChevronTexaco 2004).  The company’s total environmental capital expenditures 
continued to grow significantly between 2004 and 2006, from $213 million to $385 
million representing an 80% increase (ChevronTexaco 2005; 2006). 
In the business media, the Wall Street Journal has reported many instances of 
increased capital expenditures as a result of environmental initiatives.  In its 40th 
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Anniversary of Earth Day Special Report issue, the Journal documents organizational 
environmental initiatives and related corporate investments in environmental capital 
projects to date as far back as 1973 (Plank 2010).  The Journal has since continued to 
highlight organizational capital expenditures for environmental initiatives, most recently, 
reporting on governmental outlays of over $25 billion to help auto-makers significantly 
retool plants for electric car manufacturing (Mitchell 2010). 
Even though there is no prior literature or theory underpinning the association 
between environmental initiatives and capital expenditures, the SEC’s (2010) interpretive 
guidance and a plethora of anecdotal evidence suggest a positive association between 
firm-level environmental initiatives and capital expenditures.  Accordingly, I advance the 
following hypothesis: 
H1: There is a positive association between environmental initiatives and capital 
expenditures. 
Types of Environmental Initiatives and Capital Expenditures 
While I hypothesize that environmental initiatives at an aggregate level are 
associated with capital expenditures, I also seek to examine how the types of 
environmental initiatives influence a firm’s capital expenditures.  This is an important 
issue because environmental initiatives can vary in complexity and financial statement 
implications.  I purport that a firm’s investment in capital resources could differ based on 
the nature of the environmental initiative implemented due to the varying resource 
requirements of each type of initiative. 
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I expect initiatives related to firm use and/or development of environmentally 
friendly products and services (PROD_SERV) to significantly affect capital expenditures.  
Such initiatives may involve the development of innovative remediation products and/or 
energy efficient processes, which in turn would require significant capital resources to 
implement.  In order to meet expected environmental standards, some products may 
require design re-engineering, use of environmentally-friendly raw materials, and 
probably retooled or new, more sophisticated manufacturing equipment.   
The impact of initiatives involving the use of substantial recycled materials 
(RECYCLE) may be conditional on the industry in which the firm operates.  For 
example, firms operating in consumer non-durable industries in which packaging 
frequently consists of paper and plastic products may implement recycling initiatives in 
their packaging operations through the use of recycled paper and plastic.  However, such 
initiatives would not materially affect its capital expenditures as these firms are 
essentially shifting their focus to recycled packaging material that would be inventoried.  
In contrast, manufacturers of recycled paper and plastic packaging materials may incur 
relatively greater capital expenditures as they retool their plants and equipment.   
Additionally, I anticipate the two initiatives that most directly relate to reducing a 
firm’s carbon footprint will require relatively substantial capital investments in order to 
achieve the high-level impact for which such initiatives are established.  Initiatives 
related to notably strong pollution prevention programs (POLL_PREV) and those 
demonstrating a superior commitment to reducing firm impact on climate change 
(CLIMATE) may require substantial firm capital expenditures to implement.  Firms 
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participating in such initiatives demonstrate substantial reductions in emissions and toxic 
waste and also utilize energy efficiency, renewable energy, and clean fuel.  In order to 
achieve such substantial climate-friendly goals, firms may have to retool, materially 
modify, or completely replace fixed assets currently used in operations.  These types of 
major asset overhauls require significant firm capital expenditures.  Furthermore, these 
initiative types may pertain directly to meeting stringent Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) specifications and guidelines, a motivation for substantial firm capital 
investment to ensure proper initiative execution and acceptably low levels of 
environmental impact. 
Initiatives involving firm superior commitment to management systems, 
voluntary programs, and other environmentally proactive activities (OTHER) may have a 
relatively lower impact on capital expenditures than other initiatives.  This is because 
such initiatives may serve more of a support function as opposed to requiring significant 
tangible capital resources.  Alternatively, these activities could have a significant impact 
on capital expenditures if companies undergo substantial efforts and capital expenditures 
to enhance their operating and management systems for the long-term.  Under this 
“other” category, companies may implement environmental initiatives such as 
sustainability programs, controls, and policies that place greater demand on both human 
and tangible capital.  The theoretical differences between environmental initiative types 
and their effects on capital expenditures suggest the following hypothesis: 
H2: The association between environmental initiatives and capital expenditures 
differs across the types of initiatives. 
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While I set forth my varying expectations of the impact of the five types of 
environmental initiatives on capital expenditures, there is an inherent limitation in 
capturing this variation due to the nature of the KLD Research & Analytics, Inc. (KLD) 
data that I utilize.  Since KLD records a firm’s environmental initiatives in binary form (1 
if a firm participates in an initiative, and 0 otherwise), the extent of a firm’s 
implementation of such initiatives is not captured in my data.  While I theoretically and 
empirically examine the implications of each initiative type on capital expenditures, I 
acknowledge the possibility that the degree of initiative involvement not captured by 
KLD could impact the results. 
Sample and Research Design 
Sample 
I use the KLD database to identify firms that engage in environmental initiatives.  
KLD independently rates companies trading on U.S. stock exchanges on a range of social 
performance dimensions including the environment (KLD 2006).19  The KLD database is 
widely used and considered highly reliable due to the independence of KLD analysts, the 
objective screening criteria used to rate firms, the consistency with which ratings are 
applied across companies, and the wide range of sources used to obtain the data 
(Waddock and Graves 1997; Hillman and Keim 2001).20  This database contains firm 
data as far back as 1991 and has been increasingly used in the past several years in 
                                                            
19  Other dimensions of social performance data in KLD include community, diversity, employee relations, 
and human rights (KLD 2006) 
20  Discussions with KLD indicated that most of the environmental data are sourced from a firm’s proxy 
statements such as the Form 10-K. 
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management and accounting research (e.g., Cho et al., 2006; Bartkus and Glassman, 
2008; Sharfman and Fernando, 2008; Chen et al., 2008, Cho et al. 2009). 
I use three years of data from 2004 through 2006 since KLD restructured some of 
its data in prior years thus affecting comparability.  My initial sample comprises 9,012 
firm-year observations.  I then obtain financial and corporate governance data for these 
observations from COMPUSTAT and the Corporate Library databases, respectively.  
After converging these databases with KLD, my sample reduces to 3,387 observations.  I 
exclude financial firms based on two-digit standard industry classification (SIC = 60 to 
69) and further exclude observations without a December 31 year-end because KLD 
gathers and codes environmental data on a calendar-year basis.  This final criterion is 
critical because failure to match the data years correctly can lead to inaccuracies in the 
analyses.  This process yields 2,164 firm observations with all the necessary data.  For 
my regression analyses to follow, I winzorised the data at the 1 percent and 99 percent 
levels, and the standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White 1980).21 
Empirical Models and Variables 
I construct the following capital expenditure model based on the prior literature as 
described below.  
LNCAPEX =  f {LNASSETS, LEV, LOSS, OCF, GROWTH, FOREIGN, MERGER, 
AGE, BDINDEP, DUAL, ENV_CON, ENV_IN, INDUSTRY} 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
21  My results are consistent if I use non-winzorised data and estimate standard and robust OLS regressions. 
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Dependent Variable: Natural Logarithm of Capital Expenditures 
I use the natural logarithm of capital expenditures as my dependent variable 
(LNCAPEX).  In additional analyses, I also estimate my model by standardizing capital 
expenditures by total assets.  Additionally, I estimate an abnormal capital expenditure 
model to determine whether clients with environmental initiatives have abnormally 
higher capital expenditures. 
Test Variable: Environmental Initiative 
The KLD database provides information on a firm’s participation in 
environmental initiatives.  For each of the five such initiatives identified by KLD, a firm 
is designated a binary variable (1 if an initiative is reported, 0 otherwise) to indicate a 
firm’s participation in that specific environmental initiative.  In order to test my first 
hypothesis (H1), I analyze the effect of overall environmental initiative, which I define as 
the natural logarithm of the total number of a firm’s environmental initiatives (ENV_IN).  
This measure has been widely used in prior research and represents the extent of 
environmental initiatives undertaken by a firm (e.g., Waddock and Graves 1997; Hillman 
and Keim 2001).22 
To address my second hypothesis, I disaggregate my ENV_IN variable into the 
five types of environmental initiatives in order to examine the effect of each initiative 
type on capital expenditures.  The respective initiative is set to 1 if KLD reports a 
company has such an initiative, and 0 otherwise.  The first initiative relates to a 
                                                            
22  Prior research equally ranks each component of the KLD environmental ratings because there is no 
theoretical basis for a ranking (Hillman and Keim 2001).  Accordingly, I do not attempt to rank the 
environmental initiatives. 
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company’s use and/or development of environmentally beneficial products or services, 
such as innovative remediation products and energy efficient processes (PROD_SERV).  
The second applies to a company having notably strong pollution prevention programs, 
such as emissions and toxic-use reductions (POLL_PREV).  The third refers to a firm 
which is a substantial user of recycled materials, or is a major factor of the recycling 
industry itself (RECYCLE).  The fourth initiative indicates that a company has 
demonstrated a commitment to climate-friendly practices in order to reduce its impact on 
climate change and pollution; such measures include energy efficiency and the use of 
renewable energy and clean fuels (CLIMATE).  Finally, the fifth environmental initiative 
in my data indicates a company’s superior commitment to management systems, 
voluntary programs, and other environmentally proactive activities (OTHER).  In the 
Appendix, I include examples of each type of initiative reported in proxy statements.  I 
note here that beginning in the year 2006, KLD rated one additional environmental 
variable, ISO 14000 certification.  However, since my data covers the period of 2004 
through 2006, I exclude this variable from my primary analyses but perform additional 
tests after including this additional variable. 
Control Variables 
Given the exploratory nature of my study, I derive my control variables from 
relevant literature that examines and models some aspect of capital expenditure.  I discuss 
the nature of each of these studies and describe the related control variables incorporated 
in my model.  The studies I review can be classified as those that examine investment 
allocation and investment cash flow sensitivity.  None of the studies reviewed focus on 
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determinants of capital expenditures directly, as I do not believe such studies currently 
exist in the literature.  However, given the nature of the studies reviewed as examining 
determinants of capital investment decisions and performance, I am able to construct a 
capital expenditure determinant model. 
Whited’s (1992) study of firm capital investment allocation shows that the 
financial health of a firm affects its ability to obtain external financing, which 
consequently affects the allocation of capital expenditures over time.  In a subsequent 
finance study, Lang et al. (1996) bring clarity by showing a negative association between 
leverage and capital expansion.  Similarly, Cleary (1999) reports that a firm’s liquidity 
and ability to generate internal funds are related to investment decisions.  Almeida et al. 
(2004) examine manufacturing firms over a 30 year period and find that investment cash 
flow sensitivity is affected by a firm’s access to capital markets.  Several studies also find 
that investment cash flow sensitivity is affected by factors such as financial performance, 
free assets, growth opportunities, and firm life cycle (e.g., Broussard 2004; Bhagat et al. 
2005; Almeida and Campello 2007; Hovakimian 2009).  Taken together, these studies 
imply that cash flows and leverage are potential determinants of capital expenditures. 
In the initial accounting studies examining investment cash flow sensitivity, 
Biddle and Hilary (2006) and Biddle et al. (2009) show that firm size, profitability, 
growth opportunities, cash flow from operations, and leverage are significant 
determinants.  These authors echo the implication from the finance literature that 
financial constrains limit a firm’s capacity to invest in capital items. 
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Drawing on the preceding studies, I include firm size, leverage, loss, cash flow, 
and growth opportunities as control variables.  Firm size (LNASSETS) is measured as the 
natural logarithm of total assets less capital expenditures.  I exclude capital expenditures 
from my measure of firm size because it is my dependent variable.  I include leverage 
(LEV = ratio of total debt to total assets) because debt affects a firm’s investment 
opportunities and constraints capital investments (Whited 1992; Lang et al. 1996; Cleary 
1999; Bhagat et al. 2005; Biddle et al. 2009; Hovakimian 2009). 
I also include a variable signifying an operating loss (LOSS = 1 for firms 
reporting an operating loss in the current year, and 0 otherwise) as prior studies report an 
association between operating losses and capital expenditure policy (Bhagat et al. 2005; 
Biddle et al. 2009).  To capture availability of internal funds, I include operating cash 
flow (OCF = net operating cash flow scaled by total assets) because most, if not all, 
studies I reviewed report a significant cash flow effect on capital investment policies 
(Whited 1992; Lang et al. 1996; Cleary 1999; Broussard 2004; Almeida et al. 2004; 
Bhagat et al. 2005; Biddle and Hilary 2006; Almeida and Campello 2007; Biddle et al. 
2009; Hovakimian 2009). 
As the extant literature suggests, capital expenditures are affected by the stage in a 
firm’s life-cycle (Almeida and Campello 2007; Biddle et al. 2009; Hovakimian 2009) and 
firm growth (Cleary 1999; Bhagat et al. 2005; Biddle and Hilary 2006; Almeida and 
Campello 2007; Biddle et al. 2009; Hovakimian 2009), I include company age (AGE = 
natural logarithm of company age in years) and growth in sales (GROWTH = percentage 
change in annual sales).  Furthermore, I include a merger or acquisition in the current 
56 
 
year (MERGER = 1 if firm has experienced a merger or acquisition in current year, and 0 
otherwise) because such structural changes have been shown to influence capital 
expenditures (Almeida et al. 2004; Bhagat et al. 2005). 
I introduce the following variables not examined in the related literature as 
additional controls.  A firm with foreign operations is usually regarded as more complex 
from a financial reporting perspective because of foreign transactions, transfer pricing, 
and tax issues.  Foreign firms may also demand greater capital investment due to 
expansion and growth in non-U.S. markets.  I, therefore, include foreign operations 
(FOREIGN) as a control, which equals 1 if a firm has foreign operations, and 0 
otherwise.  I include characteristics of the board (BDINDEP = proportion of independent 
members on the board) and a powerful CEO (DUAL = 1 if the CEO also serves as the 
chairman of the board, and 0 otherwise) in order to explore the implications of these 
corporate governance measures on capital expenditures.  I focus on the board and a 
powerful CEO because capital investment decisions are considered at the board of 
director level, and a powerful CEO may attempt to push his/her own agenda (over or 
under investment in capital expenditures). 
In order to reliably evaluate the impact of my environmental initiatives test 
variable, I must control for the effect of environmental concerns on capital expenditures.  
Environmental concerns are actions taken against the firm by regulators such as the EPA 
who may demand and even litigate against the firm to rectify environmental violations.  
Firms may require greater capital expenditures in order to address such concerns.  I 
observe this anecdotally in the proxy statements of several firms.  For instance, British 
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Petroleum, specifically discloses significant capital expenditures related to “the 
prevention, control, abatement or elimination of air, water and solid waste pollution” as a 
result of the nature of its operations (British Petroleum 2006).  Pfizer makes specific 
references to large capital expenditures made “for environmental compliance purposes 
and for the clean-up of certain past industrial activity” (Pfizer 2006).  Lastly, in yet 
another environmental concern-ridden industry, FirstEnergy, one of the largest utility 
companies in the U.S., describes in its annual report that “various federal, state and local 
authorities regulate FirstEnergy with regard to air and water quality and other 
environmental matters” and goes on to detail the significant capital expenditure 
requirements as a result of such concerns and regulations (FirstEnergy 2006).   
I identify environmental concerns from the KLD database.  KLD also reports 
dichotomous data on environmental concerns, and I create an environmental concern 
variable by aggregating six types of environmental concerns and taking its natural 
logarithm (ENV_CON = natural logarithm of environmental concerns).23  My results are 
consistent if I exclude observations with environmental concerns. 
Finally, consistent with prior research (e.g., Lang et al. 1996; Biddle et al. 2009) I 
control for a firm’s industry because capital expenditures could vary with the type of 
industry and to control for industry effects on environmental initiatives.  I employ 
industry dummies according to the Fama and French ten industry portfolio (2010). For 
                                                            
23 The six environmental concerns are firms: having large hazard waste liabilities or violations of waste 
management regulations, having violations of air, water, or other environmental regulations, being 
identified as one of the top manufacturers of ozone-depleting chemicals, having high legal levels of toxic 
chemical emissions into the air and water, being identified as a substantial producer of agricultural 
chemicals, having substantial direct or indirect revenues from the sale or combustion of coal or oil and its 
derivative fuel products, and having involvement in any other environmental controversy (KLD 2006) 
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efficient reference, the operational definition of the variables, their expected association 
with capital expenditures, and data sources are summarized in Table 8. 
Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 9 presents the descriptive statistics for my dependent and control variables 
for the full sample and by sub-samples of firms that have at least one environmental 
initiative (ENV_IN > 0) and those that do not partake in any environmental initiatives 
(ENV_IN = 0).  Regarding my dependent variable of interest, I find that capital 
expenditures (LNCAPEX) are significantly higher (p < 0.01) for firms with 
environmental initiatives relative to those without environmental initiatives, which 
provides univariate support for H1.  With regard to my control variables, firms with 
environmental initiatives have significantly (p < 0.01) greater operating cash flow (OCF), 
are older (AGE), are more likely to have foreign operations (FOREIGN) and 
environmental concerns (ENV_CON), and have a board comprised of more independent 
directors.  However, firms with environmental initiatives experience lower growth than 
those without (p < 0.01).   
Multivariate Analyses 
Table 10 reports Pearson and Spearman correlation matrices for the independent 
variables in my model.  None of the correlations exceed 0.80, the point beyond which 
potential multicollinearity problems could arise.  All of the reported and untabulated 
variance-inflation factors (VIF) are below 2 and well below the threshold of 10 beyond 
which mulitcollinearity may be a problem (Kennedy 1992).  
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Table 11 presents the results for the regression of capital expenditures on the 
controls and my test variable, environmental initiative (ENV_IN).  The model has an 
adjusted R-squared of 0.46 suggesting a reasonable fit.  The results for the control 
variables indicate that LNASSETS, LEV, OCF, FOREIGN, AGE, BDINDEP, DUAL, 
and ENV_CON are positive and significantly associated with LNCAPEX.  LOSS is 
negatively associated with LNCAPEX.  Most importantly, the results indicate a highly 
significant positive association between my test variable, ENV_IN and LNCAPEX.  
Hypothesis 1 is therefore supported.  This finding suggests that firms with environmental 
initiatives support such initiatives through greater investment in capital resources.   
In addition to measuring my environmental initiative test variable as the natural 
logarithm of total firm initiatives (ENV_IN) in my primary model, I perform additional 
analysis using a binary measure of firm environmental initiatives to examine the impact 
of any firm environmental initiative on capital expenditures.  I label this new measure of 
my variable of interest ENV_YN and define it as 1 if a firm has at least one 
environmental initiative, and 0 otherwise.  Table 12 reports the results of this additional 
analysis.  The adjusted R-squared of 0.46 is the same as my initial model in Table 11.  
All associations reported in my primary analysis hold with this new measure of my test 
variable.  The finding here supports my earlier results and confirms that firms with at 
least one environmental initiative appear to support such initiatives through capital 
expenditures. 
Next, I test my second hypothesis that examines the association between each 
type of environmental initiative and capital expenditures.  In Table 13, I report the results 
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of my regression of capital expenditures on environmental type indicator variables.  This 
model is statistically significant, and the results for the control variables are consistent 
with my primary analysis in Table 11 and those in Table 12, suggesting the model is 
structurally stable. 
All environmental initiatives are positively related to capital expenditures, with 
CLIMATE, RECYCLE, and OTHER reporting statistical significance of this association 
(p < 0.01).  These findings suggests that while all environmental initiatives appear to be 
positively associated with capital expenditures, initiatives related to climate (CLIMATE), 
recycling (RECYCLE), and management systems, voluntary programs, and other 
environmentally proactive activities (OTHER) most significantly influence such 
expenditures.  The consistency of a positive association with capital expenditures 
supports the proposition that regardless of the nature of the initiative, environmental 
initiatives demand greater firm support in the form of increased capital expenditures.  
This result is consistent with my primary analysis presented in Table 11 and also 
consistent with my secondary analysis presented in Table 12. 
To shed further light on the economic significance of these findings, I perform an 
analysis of the marginal effects of each initiative based on the results in Table 13.  
Consistent with the above-reported initiative type results, I find that relative to firms 
without environmental initiatives, capital expenditures increase the most when the 
initiative is climate-related (CLIMATE), followed by recycling-related (RECYCLE), and 
finally, related to other proactive environmental systems, programs, and activities 
(OTHER).  Quantifying these amounts, my results suggest that firms with these initiative 
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types incur greater capital expenditures by an average of 124%, 87%, and 74%, 
respectively, compared to firms without such initiatives.   However, if a firm has at least 
one initiative regardless of what type it is, then the impact on capital expenditures is not 
cumulative.  Our dummy variable results (ENV_YN) suggest that capital expenditures 
are higher on average by about 101% for firms with an initiative compared to firms 
without any initiative.  Furthermore, the analysis of our continuous measure of 
environmental initiatives (ENV_IN) suggests that when there is a one unit change (one 
standard deviation) in ENV_IN, on average, capital expenditures increase by about 81%.  
These results provide strong support for the conclusion that environmental initiatives 
have significant economic consequences for capital expenditures.  
Additional Tests 
Firm Size 
I test the sensitivity of my primary results to firm size as larger firms are more 
visible and have potentially more resources to engage in environmental initiatives.  I 
partition my sample into small and large firms based on the median of LNASSETS (large 
firms > median).  For both the small and large firm subsamples, ENV_IN remains 
significant thus supporting my first hypothesis.  When I perform this size sensitivity 
analysis by initiative type, my results for the both the large and small firm subsample are 
consistent with those in Table 13.   
Environmentally Sensitive Industries 
In order to examine the sensitivity of my results to environmentally sensitive 
industries, I partition my sample into firms operating in and not operating in such 
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industries as defined by Cho et al. (2006).  These industries include oil exploration, 
paper, chemical and allied products, pharmaceuticals, petroleum refining, and metals 
industries.  For both subsamples of firms, my environmental initiative variable (ENV_IN) 
remains significant at the one percent level for both environmentally sensitive and non-
environmentally sensitive industries.  When I perform this analysis on each type of 
environmental initiative, I find that each initiative type remains significant with one 
exception.  Initiatives related to recycling (RECYCLE) for firms in environmentally 
sensitive industries become marginally insignificant, which could be attributed to low 
power as the number of such initiatives is small (n = 13).   
Yearly Analyses 
I test the sensitivity of my primary results to the financial year examined.  As 
previously noted, my sample covers years 2004 to 2006.  I conduct my regression 
analysis for each year individually and find results consistent with my earlier results.  In 
my primary tests, I excluded an additional environmental initiative variable, ISO 14000 
certification, that KLD began rating in 2006.  When I re-estimate my equations for the 
entire sample and separately for 2006 after including this additional environmental 
variable in my primary measure, ENV_IN or ENV_YN, I find consistent results.  
However, when I include this ISO 14000 initiative variable as per the analysis in Table 
13, I find it is not significantly related to capital expenditures.  This result is not 
surprising as ISO 14000 relates to meeting standards relating to documentation of 
management and control systems related to environmental issues and is not likely to 
place significant demands on capital expenditures. 
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Additional Measures of the Dependent Variable 
As an alternate measure of examining my capital expenditure dependent variable, 
I perform my analysis by scaling capital expenditures by total assets.  I obtain results 
consistent with my primary analysis. 
Abnormally High Capital Expenditures 
To assess if firms with environmental initiatives have abnormally higher levels of 
capital expenditures, I first exclude the environmental initiative variable from my primary 
model and estimate the capital expenditure model to obtain the residuals.  I then regress 
these residuals on the environmental initiative variable.  In untabulated results, I observe 
ENV_IN is positive and significantly associated with the capital expenditure residuals (p 
= 0.000).  When I repeat the analysis for environmental initiative types, I find results 
consistent with those in Table 13.  These results are consistent with and complement my 
primary findings and suggest that firms with environmental initiatives have abnormally 
higher capital expenditures than firms without environmental initiatives. 
Potentially Omitted Variables 
Although I am confident in my establishment of a parsimonious model, I include 
potentially omitted variables that could have an effect on the significance of my variable 
of interest in explaining capital expenditures.  I include the following additional control 
variables because the prior literature suggests they could influence a firm’s investment in 
capital expenditures: natural logarithm of dividends (Almeida et al. 2004; Almeida and 
Campello 2007; Cleary 1999; Biddle et al. 2009; Hovakimian 2009), Zmijewski score to 
proxy for financial distress (Biddle et al. 2009), market to book ratio (Almeida and 
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Campello 2007; Hovakimian 2009), financial reporting quality as proxied by firm 
restatements (Biddle and Hillary 2006; Biddle et al. 2009), and a corporate governance 
index to capture overall governance comprising board independence, duality, board 
meetings and presence of an accounting expert on the audit committee (Dhaliwal et al. 
2010b).  Including these potentially omitted variables does not impact the significance of 
my test variables, thus supporting the findings of my primary analysis and speaking to the 
robustness of the association between environmental initiatives and capital expenditures.  
Finally, when I exclude observations (n =13) that restated their accounts due to capital 
expenditure accounting problems, I find my results remain the same. 
Conclusion 
Corporate social responsibility continues to gain importance and momentum in 
the eyes of the capital market, corporate regulators, and the public at large.  Supporting 
this notion is the unprecedented market growth in socially responsible mutual funds and 
market indices over the past twenty years (Social Investment Forum 2010).  Furthermore, 
corporate regulators such as the SEC continue to monitor corporate social responsibility 
through authoritative guidance such as the recent environmental disclosure interpretations 
set forth to increase corporate accountability on environmental issues (SEC 2010).  The 
SEC’s guidance specifically cites the significant effect environmental initiatives may 
have on the operational and financial risks of the firm, including specifically the demand 
for capital expenditures (SEC 2010).  While there is some anecdotal evidence to support 
this assertion, extant research has yet to empirically examine the association between 
environmental initiatives and capital expenditures.  I fill this gap in the literature and 
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provide evidence that has implications for regulators, investors, auditors, management, 
and others interested in the financial implications of environmental initiatives. 
Using a sample of 2,164 firm-year observations from 2004 to 2006 and after 
controlling for other potential determinants of capital expenditures, I find a significant 
positive association between environmental initiatives and capital expenditures.  I find 
this association to persist regardless of the type of environmental initiative examined, 
although I observe a slightly higher association for those initiatives related to recycling, 
climate, or management systems, voluntary programs, and other environmentally 
proactive activities.  These results are robust to a multitude of additional analyses. 
This study is the first to empirically support the relationship between 
environmental initiatives and capital expenditures.  The finding of a significant 
association suggests environmental initiatives have important financial and resource 
implications as asserted by the SEC.  The results also support the notion that firms that 
secure funding for environmental initiatives are investing in capital resources to support 
such initiatives.  Research examining investment cash flow sensitivity related to capital 
expenditure may wish to consider environmental initiatives as a potential variable. 
Because capital expenditures are considered a high risk account from an audit 
perspective, my results also extend the findings of my first essay by providing further 
evidence that environmental initiatives could have implications for the auditor.  The 
results suggest that an auditor’s understanding and evaluation of a firm’s environmental 
initiatives could help evaluate the risk of financial misreporting in the capital expenditure 
account.  Currently, there is no other empirical evidence on the implications of 
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environmental initiatives for the performance of the audit.  I believe this would be an 
interesting consideration in future research given market, regulatory, investor, and public 
focus on socially responsible firms and the demand for related disclosures in proxy 
statements.   
Some potential limitations of my study provide opportunities for future research.  
First, my environmental initiative data does not provide certain potentially important 
details of these initiatives, such as their pervasiveness to operations or their outcomes.  
The availability of such data would provide a greater ability to analyze the related 
implications on the financial statements.  Second, I do not examine the incentives 
management faces to engage in environmental initiatives and the level of investment in 
capital resources.  Currently, the environmental literature has not considered how 
managerial incentives are related to environmental initiatives, which provides a 
potentially interesting area for future research.  Third, as with all empirical studies, I can 
only provide evidence of an association but cannot make inferences with respect to 
causation.  Fourth, while my results are robust to a comprehensive set of control variables 
and additional tests, I cannot rule out the presence of other potential omitted correlated 
variables not studied in the capital expenditure literature to date.  Lastly, while this 
second dissertation study extends the first study’s auditor perspective by examining 
financial statement implications of environmental initiatives, such initiatives may be 
examined from other stakeholder perspectives as well, a potential future research area. 
 
 
67 
 
 
IV. ENVIRONMENTAL INITIATIVES AND EARNINGS MANAGEMENT 
As I have demonstrated, corporate social and environmental responsibility are 
receiving increasing attention from regulators, market participants, the media, and the 
public at large (Social Investment Forum 2010).  Initiatives related to the environment are 
receiving more intense scrutiny, a trend that is certainly expected to continue given recent 
corporate environmental disasters such as the British Petroleum oil spill.  To enhance 
accountability and transparency, and assist capital market participants make more 
informed economic decisions, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) recently 
released the aforementioned environmental disclosure transparency initiative (SEC 
2010).24 Such disclosure initiatives underscore the unprecedented growth in socially and 
environmentally responsible investments over the past twenty years.25  Highlighting this 
growing emphasis on environmental accountability, some shareholders are even 
demanding executives and boards to terminate their relationships with companies 
presenting high environmental risk (Allen et al. 2010). 
Nevertheless, some investors have suffered significant economic losses following 
scandals at environmentally responsible firms. Bohn (2010) documents anecdotes of 
                                                            
24 This SEC interpretive release entitled Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate 
Change more thoroughly outlines an organization’s responsibility to disclose existing and potential climate 
change effects on annual report items such as the description of business, risk factors, environmental capital 
expenditures, and legal and regulatory disclosures.  Compliance with this guideline is currently not 
mandatory although the SEC is considering introducing some mandatory disclosure requirements.  
25 Investments in these funds grew from $639 billion to $2.71 trillion between 1995 and 2007 (Social 
Investment Forum 2010). Organizations providing such mutual funds include Ariel Funds, Pax World 
Balanced Funds, New Alternatives Funds, and Green Century Funds; and indices include the KLD Index 
under the RiskMetrics Group and the Dow Jones Sustainability Index. 
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fraudulent reporting and intentional abuse of millions of dollars invested in firms headed 
by high profile executives advertising socially responsible environmental initiatives.26  
Such evidence counters the general notion that executives and the governance of 
environmentally responsible firms are of relatively higher standards (VanDyne et al. 
1994; Fombrum et al. 2000).   
A potential explanation for such unexpected economic consequences is that 
market participants believe environmentally responsible firms are an attractive 
investment based on the growth and performance of such firms (Social Investment Forum 
2010).  Capital market research affirms such beliefs by documenting a positive 
association between environmental initiatives and firm performance (e.g., Bragdon and 
Marlin 1972; Spicer 1978; Douglas and Judge 1995; Guenster et al. 2006; Semenova and 
Hassel 2008). 
   However, we know from the extant literature that firms use earnings 
management techniques to meet market expectations and portray financial strength that 
may not reflect economic reality (Burgstahler and Dichev 1997; Payne and Robb 2000; 
Dechow et al. 2000; Matsumoto 2002; Das and Zhang 2003; Abarbanell and Lehavy 
2003; Lin et al. 2008).  Given the increasing attention and investments poured into 
environmentally responsible firms, it is important to empirically ascertain the extent to 
which environmentally responsible firms engage in earnings management.  The evidence 
                                                            
26 Bohn specifically cites one recent high-profile case involving the Mantria Corporation in which the 
company claimed to be developing environmentally-friendly residential communities and fuel sources, but 
then faced a complaint filed by the SEC in November 2009 that alleged Mantria to be a Ponzi scheme that 
scammed approximately 300 investors out of $30 million through fraudulent and unregistered securities 
offerings. 
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from such analyses could imply whether the relatively better financial performance of 
firms engaged in environmental initiatives are achieved through management’s 
manipulations of earnings or real economic performance.27  By doing so, this study 
contributes to the literature and practice by providing  initial insight on the association 
between environmental initiatives and earnings management. 
I hypothesize that firms engaged in environmental initiatives are associated with 
less earnings management based on both an external monitoring theory and an internal 
corporate culture theory.  The former suggests that since environmentally responsible  
firms are more closely monitored and followed by regulators, investors, society, and the 
media, management of such firms will perceive greater scrutiny and compliance pressure.  
Together, these sentiments may motivate management of environmentally responsible 
firms to not pursue questionable financial reporting practices, as the consequences of 
doing so may harm their reputation and heighten the risk of litigation.    Extant literature 
supports this notion of increased monitoring driving higher reported earnings quality or 
lower earnings management (Defond and Jiambalvo 1991; Dechow et al. 1996; Rajgopal 
and Venkatachalam 1997; Becker et al. 1998; Mitra 2002; Knayazvena 2007; Yu 2008). 
The internal corporate culture theory suggests that firms with environmental 
initiatives foster a corporate culture exhibiting moral beliefs and values for the greater 
good, and happier, more productive, and more honest employees.  Consequently, such 
corporate cultures encourage employees to act less out of self-interest, and in my context, 
                                                            
27  I assume that if environmental initiatives are not significantly positively associated but are significantly 
negatively associated with earnings management then it is likely that such firms derive their relatively 
better financial performance through real economic gains rather than earnings management practices. 
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potentially reduce the propensity for earnings manipulation.  This line of reasoning is 
grounded in research presenting evidence of better corporate citizenship breeding 
stronger corporate culture (Etzioni 1988; Tichy et al. 1997; Sherman 1997; Turban and 
Greening 1997; Leonard 1997; Maignan et al. 1999; Maignan and Ferrell 2001), which 
fosters corporate commitment and reduces employee self-interest behavior (VanDyne et 
al. 1994; Fombrum et al. 2000).  Based on these two theoretical frameworks, I predict an 
inverse association between firms engaged in environmental initiatives and earnings 
management. 
Based on a sample of 2,095 firm-year observations from 2004 to 2006 and after 
controlling for other determinants of earnings management, I find support for the 
predicted negative association between environmental initiatives and earnings 
management proxied by total discretionary accruals estimated using the performance-
adjusted modified-Jones model (Kothari et al. 2005).  My results are consistent across 
total and income-increasing measures of discretionary accruals.  I also find that 
discretionary accruals are most significantly negatively related to initiatives related to 
pollution prevention and climate protection.  My results are robust to a number of 
additional tests including partitioning by firm size, environmentally sensitive industries, 
year, and financial performance, and the inclusion of potential omitted variables. 
Overall, my initial results support the assertion that firms engaged in 
environmental initiatives exhibit lower earnings management.  This finding supports the 
notion that the relatively superior financial performance exhibited by environmentally-
responsible firms is not likely a result of earnings manipulation but more likely due to 
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real economic gains.  Moreover, my results suggest that firms engaged in pollution 
prevention and/or climate protection initiatives are least likely to manage earnings.  The 
evidence presented is consistent with the external monitoring and internal corporate 
culture theoretical frameworks drawn upon to predicate my hypothesis.  My findings add 
insight to the literature and suggest areas of future research to advance our understanding 
of the implications of environmental initiatives.  These findings also inform capital 
markets and regulators by documenting that environmentally-responsible firms are 
generally less likely to misreport financial information.  Such findings could also assist 
auditors screening for firms that are more likely to misstate their earnings.  
The remainder of this dissertation paper progresses as follows.  In the next 
section, I review the relevant extant literature.  I, then, discuss the sample and empirical 
models, presents my primary and additional analyses results, and finally, conclude the 
study. 
Background and Prior Literature 
I review two areas of pertinent literature underpinning my primary research 
question.  I first review studies that examine the association between firm environmental 
and financial performance, as I have done in my first two dissertation papers.  This 
review establishes the link between environmental initiatives and financial measures of 
firm success.  The second literary area I review provides anecdotal and empirical support 
of the association between earnings management and firm financial performance.  A 
review of this literature suggests that positive financial performance measures are 
sometimes achieved through devious earnings management means.  Deductively, these 
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two literary paradigms lead to my research question that examines the extent to which 
firms with environmental initiatives manage earnings.   
Environmental Performance and Financial Performance 
Although research in the U.S. has not historically examined corporate 
environmental performance as rigorously as in other developed nations, the existing 
studies do support an association between environmental and financial performance.28  
As early as 1972, a positive association between environmental performance and 
financial performance was supported for U.S. firms in the pulp and paper industry 
(Bragdon and Marlin).  This study along with Spicer’s subsequent 1978 empirical 
archival results support the notion that firms with better environmental pollution-control 
devices tend to be more profitable.  This research lays the foundation for the positive 
association between environmental performance and financial performance of U.S. firms. 
In the more recent empirical archival studies, firm environmental preparedness 
and performance are significant and positively associated with accounting-based 
operational and financial performance measures, such as return on assets and Tobin’s q 
(Guenster et al. 2006; Semenova and Hassel 2008).  Additionally, Douglas and Judge 
(1995) utilize a survey questionnaire administered to U.S. managers, due to lack of 
publicly available environmental initiative data, and find that firms with greater natural 
environment resources commitments exhibit superior environmental and financial 
performance.  Collectively, these studies support a positive link between environmental 
                                                            
28  Refer to Balabanis et al. (1998), Cronin (2001), and Hill et al. (2007) for a review of selected studies in 
other countries.   
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initiatives and financial performance, establishing the first premise underpinning my 
research hypothesis. 
Earnings Management and Financial Performance 
The prevalence of corporate financial scandals in the late 1990s and early 2000s 
highlighted the harsh reality that strong financial performance is not always a result of 
true economic performance; rather, they suggest that financial performance can be 
manipulated by management to appear better than the economic reality of the firm.  High 
profile companies such as Enron, Tyco, WorldCom, and Xerox, who appeared to be 
performing so well financially and commanded financial respect, were uncovered to have 
engaged in earnings manipulation to produce their strong financial results.  For Xerox, 
April 2002 revealed a massive multi-year manipulation that the SEC claims kept Xerox’s 
stock price artificially high in the late 1990s, evidence of the manner in which investors 
and the financial world at large were misled (Bandler and Hechinger 2002). 
Empirical research has similarly supported the association between earnings 
management and the appearance of strong financial performance.  Given the importance 
the market places on meeting analyst forecasts, I review literature that has examined 
earnings management as a tool for achieving forecast targets, thereby presenting positive 
financial performance to the market.  Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) provide evidence of 
management’s use of discretionary accruals to avoid losses or earnings declines.  Payne 
and Robb (2000) report that firms with pre-managed earnings below analysts’ forecasts 
have greater positive abnormal accruals.  Dechow et al. (2000) provide evidence that 
firms just meeting analysts’ forecasts have higher abnormal accruals than those that just 
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miss the target.  Matsumoto (2002) presents a positive association between income-
increasing discretionary accruals and the likelihood of avoiding negative earnings 
surprise.  Das and Zhang (2003) show that managers use discretionary accruals to round 
up earnings per share to meet analyst forecasts.  Interestingly, Abarbanell and Lehavy 
(2003) find that abnormal accruals are the main source of asymmetry in the distribution 
of forecast errors, indicating the use of accruals to meet analyst expectations in current 
and future periods.  And although recent research has brought to light other forms of 
financial statement manipulation, Lin et al. (2008) still find evidence of firms’ use of 
abnormal accruals to achieve analyst expectations when examining several forms of such 
manipulation.  These empirical archival studies consistently support the reasoning that 
positive financial performance may not always be derived from real economic substance 
but from earnings management, thus supporting the second premise underpinning my 
research hypothesis. 
Hypothesis Development 
Environmental Initiatives and External Monitoring 
Corporate environmental responsibility has received considerably more attention 
in recent years.  Increasing societal pressures, media attention, and capital market interest 
paid to environmental issues all contribute to an overall greater visibility of 
environmentally active firms by regulators and the market alike.  For example, Congress 
and corporate regulators, such as the SEC have increased their focus on corporate 
environmental responsibility through increased regulatory scrutiny, evidenced by such 
guidelines as the recent environmental disclosure rules set forth to increase corporate 
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America's accountability to stakeholders (SEC 2010).29  Such increased regulatory 
attention complements the rising interest in social and environmental responsibility on 
behalf of capital markets.  The past twenty years has seen unprecedented growth in 
socially responsible mutual funds and market indices, with investments growing 
exponentially from $639 billion to $3.07 trillion between 1995 and 2010 (Social 
Investment Forum 2010).30  Shareholders are even going so far as to demand companies 
to terminate relationships with companies presenting high environmental risk (Allen et al. 
2010).  Considering this monumental increase in societal, regulatory, and market 
coverage of environmentally responsible firms, I anticipate these firms will strive to 
provide high quality financial reporting in order to meet the increasing demand for such 
quality that comes along with rising levels of public scrutiny. 
Extant literature has supported this notion of better earnings quality with an 
increased level of market attention.  In the most recent of these studies, Knyazeva (2007) 
reports a negative association between analyst coverage, a proxy for market scrutiny, and 
earnings management, arguing that greater market coverage of firms serves as a partial 
substitute to other governance mechanisms in constraining earnings manipulation.  Yu 
(2008) also finds a significant negative association between analyst coverage and the 
                                                            
29 This SEC interpretive release entitled Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate 
Change more thoroughly outlines an organization’s responsibility to disclose existing and potential climate 
change effects on annual report items such as the description of business, risk factors, environmental capital 
expenditures, and legal and regulatory disclosures.  Compliance with this guideline is currently not 
mandatory although the SEC is considering introducing some mandatory disclosure requirements.  
30 Organizations providing such mutual funds include Ariel Funds, Pax World Balanced Funds, New 
Alternatives Funds, and Green Century Funds; and indices include the KLD Index under the RiskMetrics 
Group and the Dow Jones Sustainability Index. 
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level of firm discretionary accruals, and the likelihood to just meeting or beating earnings 
benchmarks.  This research paradigm supports my argument that greater market visibility 
of environmentally responsible firms would likely dampen the extent of earnings 
manipulation by such firms. 
 Another external source of monitoring comes from institutional owners.  Because 
institutional owners have greater resources, ability, and incentives to monitor firms in 
which they invest, they may serve as a monitoring mechanism to deter earnings 
management (Mitra 2002).  As discussed previously, environmentally active firms have 
seen a massive influx of attention from mutual funds, market indices, and the market 
alike, undoubtedly increasing these firms attractiveness to more sophisticated institutional 
investors.  In fact, as of 2010, the amount of money invested in professionally managed, 
socially screened equities passed the $3.07 trillion mark, with one of out of every eight 
institutional investment dollars part of a socially responsible portfolio (Social Investment 
Forum 2010).  Prior research on institutional ownership has reported similar results to 
those reported in the analyst coverage literature with regard to the affect of increased 
market attention on earnings management.  DeFond and Jiambalvo (1991) and Becker et 
al. (1998) find less prior period income-decreasing adjustments with the presence of 
blockholder ownership.  Dechow et al. (1996) report that firms with blockholders are less 
likely to commit financial statement fraud.  Perhaps most relevantly, Rajgopal and 
Venkatachalam (1997) find institutional ownership to be negatively related to the 
absolute value of discretionary accruals, consistent with institutional owners’ role as 
monitors of earnings quality.  These studies complement the analyst coverage literature in 
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establishing my theoretical conjecture that firms participating in environmental initiatives 
are less likely to manage earnings due to the heightened external market forces closely 
monitoring such firms.  
Environmental Initiatives and Internal Corporate Culture 
 Firm level corporate citizenship initiatives have been shown not only to impact 
financial performance as previously noted, but to impact corporate culture as well (Tichy 
et al. 1997).  Corporate social responsibility helps integrate a firm into local community 
social networks, strengthening bonds between the companies, its employees, and the 
community (Etzioni 1988).  Walter Haas, Jr., Chairman of Levi-Strauss, a company 
highly involved in social and environmental initiatives, verbalized this notion during an 
interview with Fortune Magazine in saying, “I believe that if you can create an 
environment that your people identify with, that is responsive to their sense of values, 
justice, fairness, ethics, compassion, and appreciation, they will help you be successful” 
(Sherman 1997, 104).   
Extant empirical research directly supports the influence of corporate social 
responsibility in creating and maintaining happy and productive employees.  Turban and 
Greening (1997) document that firms involved in corporate social responsibility are 
attractive to potential employees, and Maignan and Ferrell (2001) and Maignan et al. 
(1999) report higher employee commitment in such firms.  Additionally, a survey of 
executives conducted by the Conference Board shows that employee productivity, 
morale, team work, and skill development improve significantly when corporate social 
initiatives are implemented (Leonard 1997).  More recently, Lindgreen et al. (2009) 
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report survey results administered to 401 U.S. firms on corporate social responsibility 
which echo the results of prior research; they also find that corporate social initiatives 
have a positive impact on employee morale and such initiatives motivate employees and 
bond them to the company.   
If employees experience greater job satisfaction and develop greater bonding with 
the firm and its mission, they are less likely to act out of self-interest and engage in 
dysfunctional or immoral behavior.  Strong corporate cultures, such as those provided by 
socially and environmentally responsible firms, are less likely to experience self-interest 
employee behavior that conflicts with firm objectives due to the close alignment between 
the individual employee’s self-interest and the collective good of the company and 
society (Fombrun et al. 2000).  Corporate social initiatives themselves also foster altruism 
and dampen individualistic thinking, thereby lessening the risk of purely self-interested 
behavior (Van Dyne et al. 1994).  Extending this line of reasoning to financial reporting 
practices suggests that firms engaging in environmental initiatives have a corporate 
culture that would likely not condone manipulation of earnings to artificially boost 
earnings.   
The preceding discussion of the two theoretical frameworks, external monitoring 
and internal corporate culture, together suggest that earnings management would be 
lower for firms with environmental initiatives.  I, therefore, propose the following 
directional hypothesis: 
H1: There is an inverse association between environmental initiatives and 
earnings management. 
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Sample and Research Design 
Sample 
I identify firms with environmental data using the KLD Research & Analytics, 
Inc database.  KLD independently rates companies trading on U.S. stock exchanges with 
regard to their social performance across a range of dimensions, including the 
environment (KLD 2006).31  The KLD database is widely used and considered highly 
reliable because the KLD analysts are independent of the companies being rated, the 
analysts use objective screening criteria to rate firms, the ratings are applied consistently 
across companies, and a wide range of sources is used to obtain the data (Waddock and 
Graves 1997; Hillman and Keim 2001).32  This database, containing firm data as far back 
as 1991, has been increasingly used in the past several years in management and 
accounting research (e.g., Cho et al. 2006; Bartkus and Glassman 2008; Sharfman and 
Fernando 2008; Chen et al. 2008, Cho et al. 2009). 
I begin my data year in 2004 since KLD restructured some of its data in prior 
years thus affecting comparability.  My initial sample comprises 9,012 firm observations 
in calendar years 2004-2006.  I then obtain financial and corporate governance data for 
these observations from COMPUSTAT and the Corporate Library databases, 
respectively.  After converging these databases with KLD, my sample reduces to 3,697 
observations.  I then exclude financial firms based on two-digit standard industry 
                                                            
31  Other dimensions of social performance data in KLD include community, diversity, employee relations, 
and human rights (KLD 2006). 
32  Discussions with KLD indicated that most of the environmental data are sourced from a firm’s proxy 
statements such as the 10-K. 
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classification (SIC = 60 to 69) and remove observations without a December 31 year-end 
as KLD gathers and codes environmental data on a calendar-year basis.  My final sample 
comprises 2,095 firm observations with all the necessary data.  For my regression 
analyses to follow, I winzorised the data at the 1 percent and 99 percent levels, and the 
standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White 1980).33 
Empirical Model and Variables 
I construct the following earnings management model based on the prior literature 
and variables described below: 
 
DACC =  f { LN_MVE , LEV, MKTBK, LOSS, OCF, LAG_TOTACC, BIG4, 
MERGER, LITIGATION, ACEXP, ENV, YEAR FIXED EFFECTS, 
INDUSTRY } 
 
 
Dependent Variable: Discretionary Accruals (DACC) 
I use total discretionary accruals for my measure of earnings management for the 
following reasons.  First, it is widely used and has been validated as a reliable proxy for 
earnings management (Kothari et al. 2005).  Second, it is a more appropriate measure for 
my study because many environmental initiatives require significant resources that results 
in material capital expenditures.  Capital expenditures are usually reported as long term 
assets, particularly, property, plant and equipment (PPE), which is captured in the total 
discretionary accruals model.  Working capital or current accruals models do not capture 
earnings management related to PPE.  Consistent with prior research, I use the following 
                                                            
33  My results are consistent if I use non-winzorised data and estimate standard and robust OLS regressions. 
81 
 
performance-adjusted modified-Jones model as proposed by Kothari et al. (2005) to 
estimate total discretionary accruals: 
TOTACC = α0/LAG_ASSETS + α 1(ΔSALES  - ΔREC)  + α 2PPE + LAG_ROA + ε , 
where: 
 
TOTACC = Total accruals defined as net income less cash from operations 
scaled by lagged total assets; 
LAG_ASSETS = Lagged total assets; 
ΔSALES = Change in sales scaled by lagged total assets; 
ΔREC = Change in accounts receivable, netted out prior to scaling above; 
PPE = Net property, plant and equipment scaled by lagged total assets; 
and 
LAG_ROA = Lagged return on assets. 
 
 
Following prior research, the residuals from the model above serve as my proxy 
for earnings management.  I use both the absolute value of discretionary accruals 
(AB_DACC) and income-increasing discretionary accruals (INC_DACC) in my tests.  
Because management may manipulate earnings by using income-increasing or income-
decreasing accruals, the magnitude of discretion exercised is of interest, which is 
captured by AB_DACC.  As my interest is also to see if environmentally responsible 
firms report better financial performance through earnings management, the use of 
INC_DACC would test management’s use of income-increasing discretionary accruals. 
Test Variable: Environmental Initiative 
My environmental test variable (ENV) is measured three ways with my primary 
measure being the extent of environmental initiatives for each firm as reported by KLD.  
For each of the five environmental initiatives rated by KLD, a firm is designated a binary 
variable (1 if an initiative is reported, 0 otherwise) to indicate if the firm is involved in 
that specific environmental initiative.  I take the sum of these five different initiatives 
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(ENV_IN) to represent the extent of environmental initiatives undertaken by a firm.  This 
approach is widely used in prior research (e.g., Waddock and Graves 1997; Hillman and 
Keim 2001).34   
My second measure is a binary one that captures whether a firm is reported to 
have at least one environmental initiative that is coded 1, and 0 otherwise (ENV_YN).  
The purpose of this measure is to test whether a single initiative matters or if multiple 
initiatives jointly affect earnings management.  Since environmental initiatives can vary 
in complexity and the level of resources demanded, a single initiative alone may be 
sufficient to attract market attention and influence corporate culture.  This reasoning 
leads to my third measure.   
Finally, to examine the impact of specific environmental initiatives on earnings 
management, I include each of the five types of environmental initiatives in my model.  
KLD describes the nature of each environmental initiative (KLD 2006).  The first 
initiative relates to a company’s use and/or development of environmentally beneficial 
products or services, such as innovative remediation products and energy efficient 
processes (PROD_SERV).  The second applies to a company having notably strong 
pollution prevention programs, such as emissions and toxic-use reductions 
(POLL_PREV).  The third refers to a firm which is a substantial user of recycled 
materials, or is a major factor of the recycling industry itself (RECYCLE).  The fourth 
initiative indicates that a company has demonstrated a commitment to climate-friendly 
                                                            
34  Prior research equally ranks each component of the KLD environmental ratings because there is no 
theoretical basis for a ranking (Hillman and Keim 2001).  Accordingly, I do not attempt to rank the 
environmental initiatives. 
83 
 
practices in order to reduce its impact on climate change and pollution; such measures 
include energy efficiency and the use of renewable energy and clean fuels (CLIMATE).  
Finally, the fifth environmental initiative in my data indicates a company’s superior 
commitment to management systems, voluntary programs, and other environmentally 
proactive activities (OTHER).  In order to facilitate a clear understanding of these 
initiatives, I provide an actual disclosure for each initiative type taken directly from 
corporate annual reports in the Appendix.   
I also note that beginning the year 2006, KLD rated one additional environmental 
variable, ISO 14000 certification.  However, since my data covers 2004-2006, I exclude 
this variable from my primary analysis but perform additional analyses after including 
this additional variable. 
Control Variables 
Based on the prior literature, I include variables determined to be significantly 
related to measures of earnings management.  I control for firm size (LN_MVE = natural 
log of the market value of firm equity) but do not predict a direction because prior 
research reports mixed results (Frankel et al. 2002; Ashbaugh et al. 2003; Cohen and 
Zarowin 2010).  I include leverage (LEV = total liabilities to total assets) as has been 
done in extant literature (Frankel et al. 2002; Ashbaugh et al. 2003; Bergstresser and 
Philippon 2006; Cohen and Zarowin 2010; Choi et al. 2010) but do not predict its relation 
with discretionary accruals as firms may have incentives to manage earnings with greater 
leverage in order to avoid debt covenant violations, or they may have the incentive to 
refrain from earnings management due to the more stringent monitoring that accompanies 
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greater debt financing.  I include a firm’s market-to-book ratio (MKTBK = market value 
of firm equity divided by book value of firm equity) as this growth measure has been 
found to be positively associated with discretionary accruals (Frankel et al. 2002; 
Ashbaugh et al. 2003; Bergstresser and Philippon 2006; Cohen and Zarowin 2010; Choi 
et al. 2010).  I also include a loss indicator variable (LOSS = 1 if firm had an operating 
loss for the financial year, and 0 otherwise) and expect it to be positively related to 
earnings management because loss firms have incentives to report higher earnings 
(Frankel et al. 2002; Ashbaugh et al. 2003; Choi et al. 2010).  
I include operating cash flow (OCF = operating cash flow scaled by beginning of 
year total assets) as firms with greater cash flows from operations have been found to be 
less likely to manage earnings (Frankel et al. 2002; Myers et al. 2003; Ashbaugh et al. 
2003; Choi et al. 2010).  I also include a measure of the prior year’s total accruals 
(LAG_TOTACC = last year’s total accruals scaled by beginning of year total assets) as 
extant literature has done so in earnings management modeling to control for the 
variations in reversals of accruals over time (Frankel et al. 2002; Ashbaugh et al. 2003; 
Choi et al. 2010).  I predict a negative association with discretionary accruals based on 
the findings in the prior literature.  Additionally, I include auditor type (BIG4 = 1 if firm 
is audited by one of the Big 4 audit firms, and 0 otherwise) because large audit firms 
provide greater audit quality and thus may lessen earnings management (Frankel et al. 
2002; Myers et al. 2003; Ashbaugh et al. 2003; Choi et al. 2010).   
Consistent with prior research, I include a merger or acquisition during the 
financial year (MERGER = 1 if merger or acquisition occurred, and 0 otherwise) as a 
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control but do not predict a direction because of the mixed results in the literature 
(Frankel et al. 2002; Ashbaugh et al. 2003).  I also include a litigation risk variable 
(LITIGATION = 1 if the firm is in a high litigation risk industry identified by Francis et 
al. (1994) as SIC’s 2833-2836, 3570-3577, 3600-3674, 5200-5961, 7370-7374, and 0 
otherwise), as such risk has been associated with higher discretionary accruals (Frankel et 
al. 2002; Ashbaugh et al. 2003).  I expect LITIGATION to be positively associated with 
earnings management. 
I include a governance variable (ACEXP = 1 if the audit committee contains at 
least one accounting expert, and 0 otherwise) because stronger governance mechanisms 
over financial reporting may have a negative impact on a firm’s propensity to manage 
earnings (Bergstresser and Philippon 2006; Naiker and Sharma 2009; Dhaliwal et al. 
2010b).  I restrict the governance measure to accounting experts on the audit committee 
because this is the primary governance mechanism found to most significantly influence 
earnings management in recent research (Naiker and Sharma 2009; Dhaliwal et al. 
2010b).  In supplementary tests, I consider additional governance variables. 
Lastly, I include year and industry indicator variables to control for variances due 
to these factors, as other earnings management studies have done (Myers et al. 2003; 
Bergstresser and Philippon 2006).  For industry classification, I use the Fama and French 
ten industry portfolio (2010).  For efficient reference, the operational definition of the 
variables, their expected association with my measure of earnings management, and data 
sources are summarized in Table 14.  
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Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 15 presents the descriptive statistics on environmental initiatives for the full 
sample and by firms with high and low levels of earnings management based on the 
median of the absolute value of discretionary accruals.  With regard to my test variable, 
firms with greater environmental initiatives (ENV_IN) have a lower tendency to manage 
earnings.  The mean ENV_IN is significantly (p < 0.10) higher in the low DACC sub-
sample relative to the high DACC sub-sample.  This finding provides preliminary support 
for my central hypothesis, which will be tested more robustly in the multivariate 
analyses.  Regarding my control variables, firms with higher DACC tend to have less 
operating cash flow, as expected.  The descriptive data also show high DACC firms to 
have greater litigation risk and also to be larger, as proxied by market value of equity.  
They are also less likely to be audited by one of the Big 4 audit firms, as anticipated.  
These differences suggest that characteristics of firms with higher levels of earnings 
management vary significantly from firms with lower levels, which is consistent with 
prior research. 
Multivariate Analyses 
Table 16 reports Pearson and Spearman correlation matrices for the independent 
variables.  Multicollinearity does not appear to be a problem.  The largest Pearson 
correlation is between LEV and MKTBK, (r = -0.639) (Spearman correlation of -0.506), 
which is below multi-collinearity threat thresholds (Kennedy 1992).  The highest of all 
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the reported and untabulated variance-inflation-factors (VIF) is 2.056, well below the 
threshold of 10 beyond which multi-collinearity may be a problem (Kennedy 1992). 
Table 17 presents the results for the regression of the absolute value of 
performance-adjusted modified-Jones discretionary accruals on the controls and my 
primary test variable, ENV_IN.  The results for the control variables indicate that OCF 
and LAG_TOTACC are negative and significantly associated with AB_DACC, as 
anticipated.  LEV is also significantly negatively associated with AB_DACC, suggesting 
that more leveraged firms are less likely to manage earnings via discretionary accruals, 
supporting the notion that more stringent monitoring by creditors may help lessen 
management’s propensity to manipulate earnings.  I find LITIGATION and LOSS to be 
significantly positively related to AB_DACC, as anticipated, signaling that firms that 
face greater litigation risk or firms that have incurred an operating loss in the financial 
year are more likely to manage earnings through discretionary accruals.   
Most importantly, the results indicate a significant negative association between 
my test variable, ENV_IN and AB_DACC.  My hypothesis is therefore supported.  This 
finding suggests that firms with greater environmental initiatives engage in less earnings 
management as evidenced by lower levels of the absolute value of discretionary accruals.  
This finding is consistent with the theoretical frameworks supporting my hypothesis in 
that, whether due to increased external monitoring by the market, and/or due to innate 
corporate culture qualities, firms with greater environmental initiatives exhibit lower 
levels of earnings manipulation. 
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I also perform the above analysis with an alternate dependent variable measure in 
Table 18.  I isolate only those discretionary accruals that are income-increasing in order 
to provide more insight.  Since prior literature has established that firms with greater 
environmental performance also appear to have greater financial performance, I perform 
my regression analysis on only those discretionary accruals that increase reported 
income.  As shown in Table 18, my results for income-increasing discretionary accruals 
as the dependent variable are consistent with my analysis in Table 17.  My control 
variable results are also the same.  My hypothesis is, therefore, further supported, 
suggesting that firms engaged in more environmental initiatives are less likely to manage 
earnings through income-increasing accruals.   
I also perform the above analyses using two additional measures of my test 
variable.  Tables 19 and 20 present my absolute value and income-increasing 
discretionary accrual analyses employing an environmental initiative variable that 
captures whether a firm is reported by KLD to have engaged in at least one 
environmental initiative (ENV_YN).  I find that ENV_YN is significant and negatively 
associated with both AB_DACC (Table 19) and INC_DACC (Table 20), consistent with 
my findings in Tables 17 and 18.  These findings suggest that a firm engaged in at least 
one environmental initiative, regardless of what it may be, is negatively associated with 
the extent to which earnings  
In order to gain further insight on the specific types of initiatives as they relate to 
earnings management, in Tables 21 and 22, I examine how each type of environmental 
initiative is related to discretionary accruals.  I find that two types of environmental 
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initiatives are significantly negatively associated with earnings management, measured as 
absolute value of discretionary accruals: those related to a firm’s implementation of 
notably strong pollution prevention programs, such as emissions and toxic-use reductions 
(POLL_PREV), and those that indicate a firm’s commitment to climate-friendly practices 
aimed at reducing its impact on climate change and pollution, such as energy efficiency 
and the use of renewable energy and clean fuels (CLIMATE).  For income-increasing 
discretionary accruals (Table 22), I find that only POLL_PREV is negative and 
significant.35  These findings support the notion that firms engaged in pollution 
prevention and/or climate-related environmental initiatives are the least likely to manage 
earnings.  They also further support my hypothesis, adding clarity to those specific 
initiatives that most impact a firm’s level of earnings manipulation. 
While I find that two environmental initiatives are negatively related to total 
discretionary accruals, it would be appropriate to assess their economic significance.  The 
analyses suggests that firms with initiatives related to pollution prevention and climate-
friendly practices exhibit, on average, relatively lower earnings management of 3.2% and 
1.9% compared to firms without such initiatives.  Similarly, I find that a one unit (one 
standard deviation) change in environmental participation (ENV_IN) and firms with at 
least one initiative (ENV_YN) results in a 1.2% and 1.5% reduction in earnings 
management, respectively.  I do not know if these are economically important because I 
am  unaware of research showing what percentages of earnings management are material.  
                                                            
35  The lack of significance for climate-related initiatives may be attributed to the small sample size of firms 
with income-increasing accruals and such initiatives (n = 35). 
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Certainly, in light of firms managing earnings to just meet or beat forecasted earnings by 
one penny, these percentages would be economically important. 
Additional Tests 
Firm Size 
I test the sensitivity of my primary results to client size as larger firms are more 
visible and have potentially more resources to engage in environmental initiatives.  I 
partition my sample into small and large firms based on median market value of equity 
(large firms > median).  For the large firm subsample, I obtain results consistent with  my 
primary analyses; I find a significant negative association between earnings management 
and environmental initiatives (ENV_IN), and those initiatives found to have the strongest 
negative association (POLL_PREV and CLIMATE).  On the contrary, the small firm 
subsample loses significance for these variables of interest.  Upon closer investigation, I 
find that large firms report over five times the amount of environmental initiatives that 
small firms report in my sample (223 versus 44).  This finding supports the 
aforementioned notion of greater resource availability for large firms to participate in 
environmental initiatives, and the non-significant finding for small firms may be due to 
the small number of such initiatives in the small firm sample.  The disparity in 
association between large and small firms may also be attributed to the greater visibility, 
and therefore greater market and regulatory scrutiny, faced by large firms. 
Environmentally Sensitive Industries 
In order to examine the sensitivity of my results to environmentally sensitive 
industries, I partition my sample into firms operating in and not operating in such 
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industries, as defined by Cho et al. (2006).  These industries are oil exploration, paper, 
chemical and allied products, pharmaceuticals, petroleum refining, and metals industries.  
As with the reasoning underlying my hypothesis, I anticipate environmentally sensitive 
firms to be less likely to manage earnings due to greater external monitoring from 
regulators and the market, and/or due to internal corporate culture being influenced by a 
greater sense of social responsibility.  On the other hand, a firm operating in a non-
environmentally sensitive industry may have a stronger corporate culture of responsibility 
and ethical behavior because management of such firms may adopt a more voluntary 
strategy of being responsible corporate citizens by engaging in environmental initiatives.  
Thus, I expect environmental initiatives to be negatively associated in both sets of firms.  
My untabulated results of re-estimating my primary regression model for both sets of 
firms show that environmental initiative involvement (ENV_IN) is negative and 
significantly (p < 0.10) associated with discretionary accruals for both sets of firms.  
When I estimate my model that incorporates specific types of initiatives, I find that for 
firms in environmentally sensitive industries, climate-related initiatives (CLIMATE) 
appear to have the strongest negative association with a firm’s level of earnings 
management (p < 0.10); whereas for non-environmentally sensitive industry firms, 
pollution prevention initiatives have the greatest negative impact on earnings 
management (p < 0.01).  Overall, these results further support my primary analysis, as 
both industry groups appear to be less likely to manage earnings when participating more 
heavily in environmental initiatives. 
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Yearly Analyses 
I test the sensitivity of my primary results to the financial year examined.  As 
previously noted, my sample covers years 2004 to 2006.  I conduct my regression 
analysis for each year individually and find results consistent with my earlier results.  In 
my primary tests, I excluded an additional environmental initiative variable, ISO 14000 
certification because KLD began rating this measure in 2006.  When I re-estimate my 
equations for the entire sample and for 2006 after including this additional environmental 
variable in my primary measure, ENV_IN or ENV_YN, I find consistent results.  
Furthermore, when I include this ISO 14000 initiative variable in my initiative type 
analyses, I find it is negatively related to discretionary accruals, but not significantly. 
Financial Performance 
In order to test the sensitivity of my earnings management findings to firms 
reporting relatively high or low financial performance measures, I partition my sample 
based on the medians of two highly-analyzed performance measures: return on assets and 
earnings per share.  For high return on asset firms, I find results consistent with my 
primary analysis with regard to the negative association previously found between 
discretionary accruals and environmental initiatives, and types of initiatives; however, 
one more initiative type shows significance in this partition: initiatives related to a firm’s 
use and/or development of environmentally beneficial products or services 
(PROD_SERV) appear to be significantly positively related to earnings management for 
high performing firms.  This finding potentially questions the true strength of financial 
performance for firms participating in such initiatives, as it could be inflated due to 
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manipulation of earnings by management.  With regard to firms with relatively lower 
return on assets, my findings are consistent with my primary analyses, except that 
initiatives related to climate protection (CLIMATE) become an insignificant indicator of 
earnings management for these firms.  My results are also consistent when partitioning 
based on earnings per share, with the exception that for high earnings per share firms, 
recycling initiatives (RECYCLE) additionally appear to be significantly negatively 
related to earnings management, and as with low return on asset firms, low earnings per 
share firms do not appear to have an association between earnings management and 
climate initiatives (CLIMATE).  Overall, these performance sensitivity tests support my 
hypothesis that firms with greater environmental initiatives tend to be associated with a 
lower manipulation of earnings, although there appears to be variation in the types of 
initiatives that drive this association. 
Environmental Concerns 
 In addition to environmental initiative data, KLD reports and describes 
environmental concern data (KLD 2006).36  In order to test the sensitivity of my 
environmental initiative findings to the inclusion of such concerns in the earnings 
management models, I include an environmental concern variable that captures the sum 
of KLD-reported environmental concerns for each firm, similar to the derivation of the 
environmental initiative variable (ENV_IN) in the primary analysis.  The test variable 
                                                            
36 The six environmental concerns are firms: having large hazard waste liabilities or violations of waste 
management regulations, having violations of air, water, or other environmental regulations, being 
identified as one of the top manufacturers of ozone-depleting chemicals, having high legal levels of toxic 
chemical emissions into the air and water, being identified as a substantial producer of agricultural 
chemicals, having substantial direct or indirect revenues from the sale or combustion of coal or oil and its 
derivative fuel products, and having involvement in any other environmental controversy (KLD 2006).   
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findings for environmental initiatives and types remain significantly negative and 
consistent.  Additionally, I find that environmental concerns are significant and 
negatively related to discretionary accruals as well (p < 0.01).  This finding is consistent 
with my theoretical argument that firms facing greater regulatory and market scrutiny are 
less likely to manipulate earnings, as firms with known environmental concerns would 
undoubtedly face greater monitoring from external sources. 
Governance Index 
I test the impact of corporate governance on my results because stronger 
governance has been found to influence a firm’s ability to manage earnings (Dhaliwal et 
al. 2010b) and propensity to engage in environmental activities (Johnson and Greening 
1999; David et al. 2007).  To capture the overall effect of governance and to ensure my 
model is parsimonious, I derive a governance index based on the independence and 
meeting frequency of the board of directors, the size and expert considerations of the 
audit committee, and the dual nature of the CEO also serving as chairman of the board.  I 
select these governance factors because they have been found the most significantly and 
commonly associated with earnings management (Beasley 1996; Dechow et al. 1996; 
Sharma 2004; Dhaliwal et al. 2010b).  Accordingly, I calculate an indicator variable for 
each of these governance characteristics on a firm basis as follows: for board 
independence, 1 if firm board independence percentage exceeds sample board 
independence percentage median, and 0 otherwise; for board meetings, 1 if firm board 
meetings exceed sample board meetings median, and 0 otherwise; for audit committee 
size, 1 if firm audit committee size equals to or exceeds three, and 0 otherwise; for audit 
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committee expert, 1 if firm has an accounting expert on the audit committee, and 0 
otherwise; and lastly, for duality, 1 if a firm’s CEO does not also serve as chairman of the 
board; and 0 otherwise.  I then derive my governance index as the sum of each of these 
five indicator variables, whereby the higher the index, the stronger the governance 
mechanisms in place.  After incorporating this measure into the model, my test variable 
of interest (ENV_IN) remains negative and significantly related to earnings management 
(p < 0.01), supporting my primary analyses.  Furthermore, my test by types of initiatives 
yields consistent results. 
Conclusion 
As previously highlighted, the corporate world has observed an unprecedented 
increase in the attention paid to environmental accountability from a range of 
stakeholders, including Congress, regulators, the market, and society at large. Recent 
authoritative guidelines in accounting, such as the SEC’s release describing the need to 
increase environmental disclosure transparency (SEC 2010), underscore the importance 
of environmental considerations in accounting research.  This study seeks to add insight 
to this developing paradigm by examining the association between environmental 
initiatives and earnings management. 
I anticipate firms with environmental initiatives will exhibit lower levels of 
earnings management based on two theoretical frameworks.  The first is an external 
monitoring theory that suggests the greater attention, monitoring, and scrutiny of 
environmentally-active firms from regulators, capital market participants, and society 
will lessen management’s motives to artificially manipulate earnings.  This theory is 
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supported by extant research that documents higher financial reporting quality for firms 
subject to greater external monitoring (Defond and Jiambalvo 1991; Dechow et al. 1996; 
Rajgopal and Venkatachalam 1997; Becker et al. 1998; Mitra 2002; Knayazvena 2007; 
Yu 2008). 
The second framework I rely on is an internal corporate culture theory.  This 
theory posits firms with environmental initiatives have a stronger corporate culture 
because commitment to environmental responsibility stems from values and belief 
systems that are ethical and moral, and discourages pursuit of self-interest behavior.  
Such a culture is expected to be associated with lower earnings management and is 
supported by extant literature  documenting similar effects in non-accounting contexts 
(Etzioni 1988; Tichy et al. 1997; Sherman 1997; Turban and Greening 1997; Leanoard 
1997; Maignan et al. 1999; Maignan and Ferrell 2001; VanDyne et al. 1994; Fombrum et 
al. 2000).  Together, these two theoretical frameworks support my directional hypothesis 
that predicts an inverse association between environmental initiatives and earnings 
management. 
My results support this hypothesis.  I consistently find a significant negative 
association between environmental initiatives and earnings management, measured using 
the performance-adjusted modified-Jones model (Kothari 2005).  My results hold for 
both absolute value and income-increasing total discretionary accruals.  I further find that 
this association is strongest for environmental initiatives related to pollution prevention 
and climate protection efforts.  Future research with more specific data using both 
empirical archival and survey methods could provide greater interpretation of these 
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initiative type results.  Nevertheless, my results show that firms engaged in 
environmental initiatives appear to be less likely to manage earnings via discretionary 
accruals.   
Given that firms with greater environmental initiatives tend to report stronger 
financial results (Bragdon and Marlin 1972; Spicer 1978; Douglas and Judge 1995; 
Guenster et al. 2006; Semenova and Hassel 2008), and also given that managers in 
general have been shown to manipulate earnings via discretionary accruals in order to 
appear stronger financially (Burgstahler and Dichev 1997; Payne and Robb 2000; 
Dechow et al. 2000; Matsumoto 2002; Das and Zhang 2003; Abarbanell and Lehavy 
2003; Lin et al. 2008), my finding of lower earnings management for environmentally-
responsible firms supports the notion that the strong financial performance documented 
for such firms is not a result of earnings management, to the extent the evidence suggests 
in this study.  My results imply the relatively better financial performance of 
environmentally responsible firms reported in the prior literature is likely due to real 
economic gains as such firms seem to have developed better relationships with 
stakeholders, consumers and society, which in turn, creates loyalty and generates 
revenues (e.g., Fry et al. 1982; Hillman and Keim 2001; Lev et al. 2010).  Accordingly, I 
believe that environmentally responsible firms have fewer incentives to manipulate 
earnings to report better performance. 
Some potential limitations of my study provide opportunities for future research.  
First, a closer examination of the factors driving the lower discretionary accruals for 
environmentally-responsible firms could be examined.  More specifically, is this 
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association attributable to one or both of my two proposed theories (external monitoring 
and internal corporate culture), or some other theory yet to be explored?  Second, while I 
use discretionary accruals as a proxy for earnings management, it has limitations, and 
future studies could examine other proxies to test the sensitivity and generalizability of 
my results.  Some of these proxies include the likelihood of financial restatement, fraud, 
the propensity to meet or beat analyst forecasts, and earnings conservatism.  Third, my 
environmental initiative data does not provide information on the likely success of the 
initiative, nor does it capture the extent of the financial investment related to a particular 
initiative.  Such information, however, would allow for more thorough examination as it 
relates to earnings management.  For example, some initiatives may be more demanding 
of resources, more costly to implement, and their success may be questionable.  These 
types of initiatives could incentivize management to justify the investment in these 
initiatives as they face pressure to meet market expectations.  Fourth, I do not specifically 
examine the incentives facing management to engage in environmental initiatives and 
how these affect the association between initiatives and discretionary accruals.  Fifth, as 
with any empirical examination, I can provide evidence of an association; however, 
inferences cannot be made with respect to causation.  Sixth, while my results are robust 
to a comprehensive set of control variables and additional tests, I cannot rule out the 
presence of other potential omitted correlated variables not yet uncovered in extant 
earnings management literature.  Lastly, while this third dissertation essay examines 
earnings quality and expands upon environmental initiative implications from the first 
two studies, these initiatives, again, may be examined from the perspectives of a variety 
99 
 
of stakeholders, creating great promise for future important research to add insight to this 
area of growing public interest. 
 
V. DISCUSSION 
Today’s corporate world is evermore influenced by environmental considerations, 
with the United States gaining particular momentum over the past twenty years relative to 
its historical consideration of environmental issues (Social Investment Forum 2010).  
Stakeholders from every direction appear to be placing more value on environmental 
accountability, a trend that is certainly expected to continue given recent highly-
publicized corporate environmental disasters as the British Petroleum oil spill.  Emerging 
regulations, such as those recently prescribed by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, set forth guidelines for companies to enhance their environmental 
disclosure and transparency to stakeholders (SEC 2010).  
Given this heightened interest in environmental accountability, an examination of 
the strategic environmental initiatives undertaken by firms can shed light on the 
implications of firm measures to achieve stronger environmental performance.  Extant 
literature is limited with regard to examining such environmental initiatives as they relate 
to various accounting and auditing issues.  In my dissertation, I begin to address these 
issues by examining firm environmental initiatives in association with audit fees, capital 
expenditures, and earnings management. 
In my first dissertation essay, I examine the association between environmental 
initiatives and audit fees, a proxy for auditor effort.  My findings suggest that auditors do 
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consider client environmental initiatives when performing the annual financial statement 
audit, thus supporting auditors’ recognition of the increased market reliance on corporate 
environmental information and the demand this places on the annual financial statement 
audit. 
In my second dissertation essay, I follow up on my first paper’s findings by 
examining how firm environmental initiatives affect the financial statements which are 
being audited.  While their strong impact on capital expenditures has been anecdotally 
supported by such parties as the Securities and Exchange Commission (2010), extant 
research has yet to empirically examine the this association.  I, therefore, examine the 
relationship between environmental initiatives and capital expenditures and find the first 
empirical evidence of increased levels of capital expenditures with increased 
environmental initiative participation, supporting anecdotal claims and providing deeper 
insight into the financial statement implications of environmental initiatives.  
Lastly, my third dissertation essay expands upon my prior auditing and 
accounting findings to examine the quality of earnings reported by firms participating in 
environmental initiatives.  I examine the association between environmental initiatives 
and earnings management, measured by discretionary accruals calculated under the 
performance-adjusted modified-Jones model (Kothari 2005).  My results suggest that 
firms engaged in environmental initiatives are less likely to manage earnings, thus 
supporting the true economic merit of the superior financial performance exhibited by 
strong environmental performers. 
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While I discuss the potential limitations of each dissertation study specifically 
therein, some common limitations of the dissertation provide opportunities for future 
research.  First, my environmental initiative data does not provide information on the 
likely success of the initiative, nor does it capture the extent of the financial investment 
related to a particular initiative.  Such information, however, would be helpful in more 
closely examining the implications of all three studies.  Second, I do not examine the 
incentives management faces to engage in environmental initiatives and how these affect 
the associations examined.  For example, I could gain more insight on the environmental 
initiative behavior of firms seeking to reduce the cost of capital, or obtain new financing, 
or those seeking some federal or state concessions.  Third, as with all empirical studies, I 
can only provide evidence of an association but cannot make inferences with respect to 
causation.  Fourth, while my results are robust to a comprehensive set of control variables 
and additional tests, I cannot rule out the presence of other potential omitted correlated 
variables from each of the studies. Lastly, environmental initiatives can be examined 
from the perspectives of a variety of stakeholders.  This opens many avenues of future 
research dedicated to gaining a better understanding of corporate environmental initiative 
participation, a topic gaining tremendous momentum in practice.  My dissertation 
provides a foundation for this research, and I hope that the studies and findings herein 
encourage debates and discussions on this important issue facing today’s corporate world. 
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ACCOMPANYING TABLES 
TABLE 1 
Essay One Variable Definitions 
Variable Name 
 Expected 
Sign 
 
Variable Measurement 
 
Panel A: Dependent Variable 
  
LNAUDFEE  Natural logarithm of audit fees paid to the external 
auditor (Audit Analytics) 
Panel B: Test Variables   
ENV_IN  ?  Natural logarithm of the sum of types of environmental 
initiatives for a firm in a given year as reported by KLD 
Analytics. 
EI_YN* LNCAPEX  +  Multiplicative product of EI_YN and LNCAPEX where 
EI_YN equals 1 if KLD reports a firm has at least one 
environmental initiative, and 0 otherwise, and LNCAPEX 
is the natural logarithm of capital expenditure 
(Compustat). 
Panel B: Control Variables 
LNASSETS  +  Natural logarithm of total assets (Compustat). 
IND_ES  ?  1 if firm is a member of an environmentally-sensitive 
industry as defined by Cho et al. (2006), and 0 otherwise. 
SEGNUM  +  Number of reported business segments (Compustat). 
FOREIGN  +  1 if firm has foreign operations, and 0 otherwise 
(Compustat). 
INVAR  +  Inventory plus accounts receivable scaled by total assets 
(Compustat). 
LOSS  +  1 if firms reports a loss in the fiscal year, and 0 otherwise 
(Compustat). 
LEV  +  Total debt to total assets (Compustat). 
BDSIZE  ?  Number of members on the Board of Directors 
(Corporate Library). 
BDMTGS  ?  Number of annual board meetings (Corporate Library). 
BDINDEP  ?  Proportion of board members who are independent 
(Corporate Library). 
BIG4  +  1 if firm is audited by a Big 4, and 0 otherwise 
(Compustat). 
LNNAS  ?  Natural logarithm of non-audit fees (Audit Analytics). 
ZSCORE  +  Zmijewski score as an indicator of financial distress 
(Compustat). 
GROWTH  +  Percentage growth in sales over the prior year 
(Compustat). 
INITIAL  ?  1 if the auditor is in the initial year of the audit, and 0 
otherwise (Audit Analytics). 
SPECIAL  +  Special items scaled by total assets (Compustat). 
  
Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics for Environmental Initiatives 
 
Incidence of Environmental Initiatives 
 
(n = 2,474) 
Environmentally Sensitive 
Industries 
(n = 479) 
Non-Environmentally Sensitive 
Industries 
(n = 1,995) 
Variable Number % Number % Number % 
PROD_SERV 67 2.71 21 4.38 46     2.31** 
POLL_PREV 54 2.18 21 4.38 33       1.65*** 
RECYCLE 39 1.58 13 2.71 26   1.30* 
CLIMATE 110 4.45 26 5.43 84 4.21 
OTHER 57 2.30 19 3.97 38      1.90** 
TOTAL 327 13.2 100 20.8 227       11.38*** 
***, **, * denote significant differences between environmentally sensitive industries and non-environmentally sensitive industries at the 0.01, 0.05, 
and 0.10 levels, respectively.  
PROD_SERV = 1 if a firm uses and/or develops environmentally beneficial products or services, such as innovative remediation products and energy 
efficient processes, and 0 otherwise; POLL_PREV = 1 if a firm has notably strong pollution prevention programs, such as emissions and toxic-use 
reductions, and 0 otherwise; RECYCLE = 1 if a firm is a substantial user of recycled materials, or is a major factor of the recycling industry itself, 
and 0 otherwise; CLIMATE = 1 if a firm demonstrates a commitment to climate-friendly practices in order to reduce its impact on climate change 
and pollution; such measures include energy efficiency and the use of renewable energy and clean fuels, and 0 otherwise; and OTHER = 1 if a firm 
has superior commitment to management systems, voluntary programs, and other environmentally proactive activities.  
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Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics for Essay One Full Sample and for Firms with and without Environmental Initiatives 
 Full Sample (n = 2,474) 
Firms with Environmental 
Initiatives 
(n = 248 ) 
Firms without Environmental 
Initiatives 
(n = 2,226 ) 
Test of 
Differencesb 
Variable Mean Median SD Mean Median SD Mean Median SD t-statistic 
LNAUDFEE 14.47 14.39 1.04 15.41 15.61 1.15 14.36 14.31 0.97 13.81*** 
LNASSETS 12.11 11.96 1.52 13.52 13.80 1.55 11.95 11.83 1.43 15.24*** 
IND_ES 0.19 0.00 0.40 0.28 0.00 0.45 0.18 0.00 0.39 3.31*** 
SEGNUM 6.07 4.00 5.25 8.48 9.00 6.50 5.80 3.00 5.02 6.28*** 
FOREIGN 0.30 0.00 0.46 0.45 0.00 0.50 0.28 0.00 0.45 4.96*** 
INVAR 0.22 0.20 0.15 0.21 0.20 0.11 0.22 0.20 0.16 0.92 
LOSS 0.11 0.00 0.32 0.13 0.00 0.33 0.11 0.00 0.31 0.69 
LEV 0.56 0.55 0.26 0.50 0.52 0.24 0.57 0.56 0.27 3.84*** 
BDSIZE 10.79 10.00 3.91 12.68 11.00 4.23 10.58 10.00 3.82 7.51*** 
BDMTGS 7.72 7.00 3.50 8.24 8.00 2.71 7.66 7.00 3.57 3.11*** 
BDINDEP 0.66 0.67 0.16 0.74 0.75 0.12 0.65 0.67 0.16 11.09*** 
BIG4 0.96 1.00 0.20 0.98 1.00 0.13 0.95 1.00 0.21 3.24*** 
LNNAS 12.06 12.54 2.92 13.62 13.95 2.14 11.88 12.42 2.94 11.60*** 
ZSCORE -1.50 -1.57 1.61 -1.13 -1.06 1.34 -1.54 -1.62 1.63 4.49*** 
GROWTH 1.68 0.11 0.25 0.11 0.09 0.17 1.85 0.12 0.25 0.35 
INITIAL 0.09 0.00 0.29 0.05 0.00 0.22 0.10 0.00 0.30 2.82*** 
SPECIAL 0.02 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.06 0.75 
LNCAPEX 4.30 4.19 1.76 5.83 6.13 1.65 4.13 3.99 1.69 15.83*** 
***, **, * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.  See Table 1 for variable definitions.   
bTest results are identical when I use non-parametric tests. 
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Table 4 
Correlations: Pearson (Spearman) Correlations are Presented in the Upper (Lower) Diagonala 
 LNASSETS IND_ES SEGNUM FOREIGN INVAR LOSS LEV BDSIZE BDMTGS 
LNASSETS  0.063 0.265 0.076 -0.192 0.016 -0.128 0.419 0.173 
IND_ES 0.061  -0.017 0.112 -0.096 0.056 -0.078 0.010 0.033 
SEGNUM 0.227 -0.030  -0.001 0.073 0.062 -0.071 0.001 0.051 
FOREIGN 0.068 0.112 -0.019  0.134 -0.023 -0.020 0.034 -0.047 
INVAR -0.186 -0.066 0.121 0.183  -0.032 0.030 -0.069 -0.153 
LOSS 0.017 0.056 0.038 -0.023 -0.034  0.082 -0.005 0.007 
LEV -0.131 -0.097 -0.060 -0.009 0.049 0.047  -0.027 0.009 
BDSIZE 0.416 0.023 -0.017 0.034 -0.065 0.004 -0.016  0.131 
BDMTGS 0.199 0.051 0.053 -0.029 -0.136 -0.002 -0.009 0.148  
BDINDEP 0.188 0.052 0.166 0.048 0.058 0.030 -0.043 -0.031 0.081 
BIG4 0.198 -0.013 0.041 0.021 -0.027 0.005 0.006 0.078 0.017 
LNNAS 0.572 0,017 0.193 0.200 0.044 0.008 -0.065 0.224 0.184 
ZSCORE 0.373 0.055 0.113 -0.097 -0.128 0.030 -0.099 0.227 0.168 
GROWTH -0.086 0.095 -0.049 -0.028 0.049 -0.009 0.059 -0.134 -0.045 
INITIAL -0.133 -0.014 -0.025 -0.007 -0.004 -0.024 0.018 -0.085 0.006 
SPECIAL 0.093 0.089 0.042 0.115 -0.002 0.025 -0.018 0.041 0.147 
LNCAPEX 0.864 0.123 0.170 0.022 -0.246 0.001 -0.146 0.387 0.160 
ENV_IN 0.289 0.076 0.124 0.110 0.020 0.016 -0.076 0.170 0.094 
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 Table 4 (continued) 
 BDINDEP BIG4 LNNAS ZSCORE GROWTH INITIAL SPECIAL LNCAPEX ENV_IN 
LNASSETS 0.175 0.192 0.441 0.243 0.010 -0.129 -0.028 0.878 0.305 
IND_ES 0.058 -0.013 0.013 0.094 -0.009 -0.014 0.046 0.126 0.085 
SEGNUM 0.185 0.045 0.181 0.095 -0.024 -0.029 -0.023 0.202 0.183 
FOREIGN 0.050 0.021 0.132 -0.070 -0.013 -0.007 0.007 0.034 0.131 
INVAR 0.028 -0.032 0.014 -0.105 -0.025 0.006 -0.022 -0.249 0.001 
LOSS 0.029 0.005 0.020 0.035 -0.007 -0.024 -0.014 -0.004 0.033 
LEV -0.033 0.012 -0.052 -0.054 -0.010 0.010 -0.006 -0.135 -0.075 
BDSIZE -0.051 0.069 0.161 0.191 0.001 -0.075 0.053 0.380 0.157 
BDMTGS 0.072 0.007 0.107 0.133 -0.016 0.042 0.059 0.135 0.055 
BDINDEP  0.090 0.130 0.083 -0.003 -0.022 0.000 0.146 0.157 
BIG4 0.096  0.217 0.093 0.004 -0.320 0.004 0.154 0.027 
LNNAS 0.165 0.177  0.117 -0.005 -0.232 0.024 0.334 0.173 
ZSCORE 0.134 0.108 0.175  0.009 -0.028 0.160 0.208 0.062 
GROWTH -0.034 0.028 -0.064 -0.188  -0.006 -0.005 -0.047 -0.006 
INITIAL -0.022 -0.320 -0.165 -0.037 0.014  0.005 -0.100 -0.025 
SPECIAL 0.059 0.058 0.179 0.189 -0.126 -0.007  -0.065 -0.016 
LNCAPEX 0.150 0.154 0.425 0.324 -0.047 -0.100 0.010  0.283 
ENV_IN 0.174 0.043 0.255 0.106 -0.070 0.044 0.019 0.277  
aCorrelations significant at the two-tailed 0.05 level are in bold figures.  See Table 1 for variable definitions. 
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Table 5  
Regression of Audit Fees on Environmental Initiatives 
 
LNAUDFEE = f {LNASSETS, IND_ES, SEGNUM, FOREIGN, INVAR, LOSS, LEV, BDSIZE, 
BDMTGS, BDINDEP, BIG4, LNNAS, ZSCORE, GROWTH, INITIAL, 
SPECIAL, ENV_IN, YEAR FIXED EFFECTS} 
 
Variable Expected  Sign Estimate   t-statistic 
Intercept ? 7.658 55.637*** 
LNASSETS + 0.456 42.732*** 
IND_ES ? -0.105 3.629*** 
SEGNUM + 0.012 5.212*** 
FOREIGN + 0.328 13.080*** 
INVAR + 0.992 12.893*** 
LOSS + -0.033 0.927 
LEV + 0.091 1.862** 
BDSIZE ? 0.004 0.860 
BDMTGS ? 0.018 5.012*** 
BDINDEP ? 0.213 2.800*** 
BIG4 + 0.128 2.167** 
LNNAS ? 0.037 8.300*** 
ZSCORE + 0.020 2.477*** 
GROWTH + -0.173 3.761*** 
INITIAL ? -0.077 1.875** 
SPECIAL + 1.834 4.616*** 
ENV_IN ? 0.129 4.258*** 
YEAR FIXED EFFECTS  yes  
    
Observations    2,474   
Adjusted R2/F-value 0.70  297.270*** 
VIF Range 1.023 – 2.199   
***, **, * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 levels, respectively.  The t-statistics are based 
on White’s (1980) adjusted standard errors.  See Table 1 for variable definitions. 
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Table 6 
Regression of Audit Fees on  
Environmental Initiative Indicator and Types of Initiatives 
 
LNAUDFEE = f {LNASSETS, IND_ES, SEGNUM, FOREIGN, INVAR, LOSS, LEV, 
BDSIZE, BDMTGS, BDINDEP, BIG4, LNNAS, ZSCORE, GROWTH, 
INITIAL, SPECIAL, ENV_YN (or INITIATIVE TYPES), YEAR FIXED 
EFFECTS} 
 
        ENV_YN    INITIATIVE TYPES 
Variable Expected Sign Estimate t-statistic  Estimate t-statistic 
Intercept ? 7.656 55.68*** 7.647 55.194*** 
LNASSETS + 0.456 42.75*** 0.458 42.619*** 
IND_ES ? -0.105 3.61*** -0.101 3.81*** 
SEGNUM + 0.012 5.35*** 0.012 5.03*** 
FOREIGN + 0.329 13.15*** 0.321 12.76*** 
INVAR + 0.994 12.92*** 0.981 12.73*** 
LOSS + -0.031 0.88 -0.033 0.92 
LEV + 0.092 1.90** 0.091 1.86** 
BDSIZE ? 0.004 0.86 0.004 0.86 
BDMTGS ? 0.018 5.04*** 0.018 4.99*** 
BDINDEP ? 0.208 2.74*** 0.218 2.87*** 
BIG4 + 0.127 2.14** 0.125 2.12** 
LNNAS ? 0.037 8.27*** 0.037 8.20*** 
ZSCORE + 0.020 2.42*** 0.022 2.61*** 
GROWTH + -0.172 3.75*** -0.170 3.70*** 
INITIAL ? -0.076 1.83** -0.081 1.97** 
SPECIAL + 1.830 4.61*** 1.806 4.55*** 
ENV_YN ? 0.170 4.30***   
PROD_SERV ?   0.186 2.67*** 
POLL_PREV ?   0.228 2.81*** 
RECYCLE ?   0.022 0.25 
CLIMATE ?   -0.009 0.16 
OTHER ?   0.219 2.77*** 
YEAR FIXED EFFECTS yes  yes  
      
Observations  2,474    
Adj. R2/F-value  0.70 297.3*** 0.70 246.67*** 
VIF Range  1.023 – 2.494  1.025 – 2.509  
***, **, * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 levels, respectively.  The t-statistics are based 
on White’s (1980) adjusted standard errors.  See Tables 1 and 2 for variable definitions. 
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Table 7 
Regression of Audit Fees on Environmental Initiatives Conditional on Capital Expenditure 
LNAUDFEE = f {LNASSETS, IND_ES, SEGNUM, FOREIGN, INVAR, LOSS, LEV, 
BDSIZE, BDMTGS, BDINDEP, BIG4, LNNAS, ZSCORE, GROWTH, 
INITIAL, SPECIAL, ENV_YN, LNCAPEX (or ENV_YN, LNCAPEX, 
ENV_YN*LNCAPEX), YEAR FIXED EFFECTS} 
  Environmental Initiative and Capital Expenditure 
Environmental Initiative and  
Capital Expenditure Interaction 
Variable Expected Sign Estimate t-statistic Estimate t-statistic 
Intercept ? 6.930 40.71*** 7.047 40.99*** 
LNASSETSa + 0.555 31.71*** 0.549 31.38*** 
IND_ES ? -0.076 2.63*** -0.076 2.63*** 
SEGNUM + 0.012 5.27*** 0.012 5.23*** 
FOREIGN + 0.318 12.81*** 0.315 12.71*** 
INVAR + 0.912 11.84*** 0.903 11.76*** 
LOSS + -0.041 1.17 -0.045 1.28* 
LEV + 0.079 1.63** 0.077 1.60** 
BDSIZE ? 0.004 0.95 0.004 0.85 
BDMTGS ? 0.017 4.71*** 0.017 4.71*** 
BDINDEP ? 0.210 2.79*** 0.194 2.58*** 
BIG4 + 0.123 2.10** 0.122 2.08** 
LNNAS ? 0.035 7.81*** 0.034 7.76*** 
ZSCORE + 0.020 2.42*** 0.022 2.66*** 
GROWTH + -0.160 3.51*** -0.159 3.50*** 
INITIAL ? -0.071 1.74** -0.069 1.71** 
SPECIAL + 1.514 3.83*** 1.441 3.65*** 
ENV_YN ? 0.183 4.67*** -0.142 1.65* 
LNCAPEX + 0.458 43.35*** 0.448 41.52*** 
ENV_YN*LNCAP
EX +   0.060 4.21*** 
YEAR FIXED EFFECTS  yes  yes  
Observations  2,474    
Adj. R2/F-val.  0.70 290.7***  0.70 279.6*** 
VIF Range        1.024 – 2.827            1.025 – 6.177 
***, **, * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 levels, respectively.  The t-statistics are based on 
White’s (1980) adjusted standard errors. 
a For the second and third models herein, LNASSETS excludes capital expenditure as they are included 
as a variable of interest in the models. 
EI_YN = 1 if a firm is involved in at least one environmental initiative, and 0 otherwise; LNCAPEX = 
the natural logarithm of total capital expenditure; and EI_YN*LNCAPEX = interaction term for the 
two aforementioned variables.  See Table 1 for other variable definitions. 
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TABLE 8 
Essay Two Variable Definitions 
 
Variable Name 
 Expected 
Sign 
 
Variable Measurement 
 
Panel A: Dependent Variable 
LNCAPEX    Natural logarithm of capital expenditures (Compustat) 
Panel B: Test Variable 
ENV_IN  +  Natural logarithm of the sum of the number of 
environmental initiatives for a firm in a given year 
(KLD). 
Panel C: Control Variables 
LNASSETS  +  Natural logarithm of total assets less capital 
expenditures (Compustat). 
LEV  ?  Total debt to total assets (Compustat). 
LOSS  -  1 if firms reports a loss in the fiscal year, and 0 
otherwise (Compustat). 
OCF  +  Operating cash flow scaled by total assets (Compustat). 
GROWTH  ?  Percentage growth in sales over the prior year 
(Compustat). 
FOREIGN  +  1 if firm has foreign operations, and 0 otherwise 
(Compustat).  
MERGER  +  1 if firm was involved in a merger or acquisition in the 
current year, and 0 otherswise (Compustat). 
AGE  +  Natural logarithm of company age in years 
(Compustat). 
BDINDEP  ?  Proportion of board members who are independent 
(Corporate Library). 
DUAL  ?  1 if CEO also serves as board chairman, and 0 
otherwise (Corporate Library). 
ENV_CON  +  Natural logarithm of the sum of the number of 
environmental concerns (KLD). 
INDUSTRY  ?  Ten portfolio industry dummy variables as defined by 
Fama and French (2010). 
  
 
Table 9 
Descriptive Statistics for Essay Two Full Sample and for Firms with and without Environmental Initiatives 
 Full Sample (n = 2,164) 
Firms with Environmental 
Initiatives 
(n = 179) 
Firms without Environmental 
Initiatives 
(n = 1,985) 
Test of 
Differencesb 
Variable Mean Median SD Mean Median SD Mean Median SD t-statistic 
LNCAPEX 4.10 4.00 1.53 5.39 5.66 1.52 3.99 3.90 1.48 13.32*** 
LNASSETS 7.66 7.60 1.69 7.75 7.70 1.73 7.65 7.59 1.69 1.06 
LEV 0.57 0.57 0.23 0.55 0.56 0.22 0.58 0.57 0.23 0.83 
LOSS 0.10 0.00 0.30 0.09 0.00 0.29 0.10 0.00 0.30 0.32 
OCF 0.21 0.07 0.32 0.37 0.19 0.44 0.19 0.06 0.30 5.95*** 
GROWTH 0.16 0.12 0.22 0.11 0.09 0.15 0.16 0.12 0.23 4.60*** 
FOREIGN 0.30 0.00 0.46 0.44 0.00 0.50 0.29 0.00 0.46 4.53*** 
MERGER 0.07 0.00 0.26 0.04 0.00 0.21 0.07 0.00 0.26 0.89 
AGE 2.86 3.09 1.45 3.40 3.66 1.32 2.81 3.04 1.45 5.71*** 
BDINDEP 0.66 0.67 0.16 0.74 0.74 0.12 0.65 0.67 0.16 8.42*** 
DUAL 0.46 0.00 0.50 0.44 0.00 0.50 0.46 0.00 0.50 0.10 
ENV_CON 0.17 0.00 0.38 0.48 0.00 0.55 0.15 0.00 0.35 8.93*** 
***, **, * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.  See Table 8 for variable definitions.   
bTest results are identical when I use non-parametric tests. 
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Table 10 
Essay Two Pearson and Spearman Correlations 
Correlations: Pearson (Spearman) Correlations are Presented in the Upper (Lower) Diagonala 
 LNASSETS LEV LOSS OCF GROWTH FOREIGN MERGER 
LNASSETS  0.444 -0.167 -0.574 0.049 0.035 0.024 
LEV 0.456  0.057 -0.276 0.031 -0.003 0.035 
LOSS -0.162 0.059  0.106 -0.035 0.000 -0.025 
OCF -0.677 -0.322 0.102  -0.048 0.027 -0.016 
GROWTH 0.059 0.042 -0.015 -0.051  0.020 0.115 
FOREIGN 0.031 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.030  0.011 
MERGER 0.026 0.032 -0.025 -0.017 0.111 0.011  
AGE -0.011 -0.088 0.016 0.156 -0.105 0.039 -0.018 
BDINDEP 0.008 -0.031 0.028 0.106 -0.032 0.045 -0.009 
DUAL -0.009 0.031 -0.087 0.047 0.032 -0.007 0.007 
ENV_CON 0.012 -0.059 0.047 0.191 -0.037 0.004 0.000 
ENV_IN 0.017 -0.027 -0.002 0.142 -0.063 0.091 -0.031 
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Table 10 (continued) 
 
 AGE BDINDEP DUAL ENV_CON ENV_IN 
LNASSETS -0.005 0.007 -0.011 0.016 0.014 
LEV -0.079 -0.026 0.040 -0.055 -0.026 
LOSS 0.019 0.025 -0.087 0.040 0.002 
OCF 0.124 0.093 0.028 0.197 0.175 
GROWTH -0.101 -0.034 0.024 -0.022 -0.061 
FOREIGN 0.046 0.051 -0.007 0.011 0.095 
MERGER -0.011 -0.012 0.007 0.001 -0.031 
AGE  0.088 -0.004 0.039 0.115 
BDINDEP 0.091  0.023 0.168 0.151 
DUAL 0.006 0.025  0.041 -0.015 
ENV_CON 0.046 0.157 0.040  0.233 
ENV_IN 0.117 0.150 -0.014 0.229  
aCorrelations significant at the two-tailed 0.05 level are in bold figures.  See Table 8 for variable definitions. 
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Table 11  
Hypothesis 1: Regression of Capital Expenditures on Environmental Initiatives 
 LNCAPEX =  f {LNASSETS, LEV, LOSS, OCF, GROWTH, FOREIGN, MERGER, AGE,  
    BDINDEP, DUAL, ENV_CON, ENV_IN, INDUSTRY} 
     
Variable Expected Sign Estimate t-statistic  
Intercept ? 1.342 6.835***  
LNASSETS + 0.170 8.571***  
LEV ? 0.442 3.603***  
LOSS - -0.260 -3.058***  
OCF + 2.183 21.611***  
GROWTH ? -0.056 -0.497  
FOREIGN + 0.154 2.727***  
MERGER + -0.069 -0.718  
AGE + 0.126 7.114***  
BDINDEP ? 0.428 2.579***  
DUAL ? 0.135 2.733***  
ENV_CON + 0.632 8.207***  
ENV_IN + 0.764 6.714***  
INDUSTRY  Yes   
     
Observations  2,164       
Adjusted R2/F-value  0.46  87.273***  
VIF Range 1.020 – 1.913    
***, **, * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 levels, respectively.  The t-statistics are based on White’s 
(1980) adjusted standard errors.  See Table 8 for variable definitions. 
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Table 12  
Hypothesis 1 Additional Testing: Regression of Capital  
Expenditures on Any Environmental Initiative Participation 
 
 LNCAPEX =  f {LNASSETS, LEV, LOSS, OCF, GROWTH, FOREIGN, MERGER, AGE,  
  BDINDEP, DUAL, ENV_CON, ENV_YN, INDUSTRY} 
     
Variable Expected Sign Estimate t-statistic  
Intercept ? 1.364 6.973***  
LNASSETS + 0.169 8.531***  
LEV ? 0.433 3.549***  
LOSS - -0.253 -2.986***  
OCF + 2.171 21.594***  
GROWTH ? -0.041 -0.366  
FOREIGN + 0.149 2.649***  
MERGER + -0.079 -0.826  
AGE + 0.124 7.003***  
BDINDEP ? 0.431 2.610***  
DUAL ? 0.130 2.650***  
ENV_CON + 0.601 7.797***  
ENV_YN + 0.698 7.845***  
INDUSTRY  yes   
     
Observations 2,164    
Adjusted R2/F-value 0.46  88.698***  
VIF Range 1.020 – 1.913    
***, **, * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 levels, respectively.  The t-statistics are based 
on White’s (1980) adjusted standard errors.  See Table 8 for variable definitions. 
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Table 13 
Hypothesis 2: Regression of Capital Expenditures on Environmental Initiative Types  
 
LNCAPEX =  f {LNASSETS, LEV, LOSS, OCF, GROWTH, FOREIGN, MERGER, AGE,  
 BDINDEP, DUAL, ENV_CON, PROD_SERV, POLL_PREV, RECYCLE, 
 CLIMATE, OTHER, INDUSTRY} 
 
Variable Expected Sign Estimate          t-statistic  
Intercept  1.337 6.789***  
LNASSETS + 0.169 8.523***  
LEV ? 0.438 3.577***  
LOSS - -0.267 -3.145***  
OCF + 2.178 21.441***  
GROWTH ? -0.058 -0.514  
FOREIGN + 0.161 2.843***  
MERGER + -0.065 -0.676  
AGE + 0.128 7.227***  
BDINDEP ? 0.445 2.679***  
DUAL ? 0.140 2.822***  
ENV_CON + 0.617 7.952***  
PROD_SERV + 0.054 0.344  
POLL_PREV + 0.210 1.087  
RECYCLE + 0.808 3.843***  
CLIMATE + 0.624 3.877***  
OTHER + 0.552 2.807***  
INDUSTRY  yes   
     
Observations 2,164    
Adjusted R2/F-value 0.46  74.673***  
VIF Range 1.026 – 1.734    
***, **, * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 levels, respectively.  The t-statistics are based on 
White’s (1980) adjusted standard errors. See Table 8 for variable definitions. 
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TABLE 14 
Essay Three Variable Definitions 
 
Variable Name 
 Expected 
Sign 
 
Variable Measurement 
 
Panel A: Dependent Variables 
  
AB_DACC  Absolute value of firm performance-adjusted modified-
Jones model discretionary accruals (Kothari et al. 2005). 
INC_DACC  Income-increasing firm performance-adjusted modified-
Jones model discretionary accruals (Kothari et al. 2005). 
Panel B: Test Variables   
ENV_IN  -  Sum of types of environmental initiatives for a firm in a 
given year as reported by KLD Analytics. 
ENV_YN  -  1 if a firm engages in at least one environmental initiative 
as reported by KLD Analytics, and 0 otherwise. 
Panel B: Control Variables 
LN_MVE  ?  Natural log of the market value of firm equity (Compustat). 
LEV  ?  Total debt to total assets (Compustat). 
MKTBK  +  Market value of equity divided by book value of equity 
(Compustat). 
LOSS  +  1 if firms reports a loss in the fiscal year, and 0 otherwise 
(Compustat). 
OCF  -  Operating cash flow scaled by beginning of year total assets 
(Compustat). 
LAG_TOTACC  -  Last year’s total accruals scaled by beginning of year total 
assets (Compustat). 
BIG4  -  1 if firm is audited by a Big 4, and 0 otherwise 
(Compustat). 
MERGER  ?  1 if firm was involved in a merger or acquisition in the 
current year, and 0 otherswise (Compustat). 
LITIGATION  +  1 if the firm is in a high litigation risk industry identified by 
Francis et al. (1994) as SIC’s 2833-2836, 3570-3577, 3600-
3674, 5200-5961, 7370-7374, and 0 otherwise. 
(Compustat). 
ACEXP  -  1 if audit committee contains at least one accounting expert, 
and 0 otherwise (Corporate Library and proxy statements). 
YEAR FIXED EFFECTS    Year dummies.  
INDUSTRY    Ten portfolio industry dummy variables as defined by Fama 
and French (2010). 
  
 
 
 
Table 15 
Descriptive Statistics for Essay Three Full Sample and for Firms with High and Low Discretionary Accruals 
 Full Sample (n = 2,095) 
High Discretionary Accruals Firms 
(n = 1,048 ) 
Low Discretionary Accruals Firms 
(n = 1,047 ) 
Test of 
Differencesb 
Variable Mean Median SD Mean Median SD Mean Median SD t-statistic 
LN_MVE 21.39 21.21 1.36 21.44 21.27 1.35 21.34 21.15 1.36 1.78* 
LEV 0.56 0.55 0.23 0.57 0.56 0.23 0.55 0.54 0.23 1.44 
MKTBK 1.33 1.04 1.14 1.31 1.00 1.16 1.36 1.09 1.11 1.04 
LOSS 0.11 0.00 0.32 0.12 0.00 0.32 0.11 0.00 0.31 0.94 
OCF 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.99 0.86 2.03** 
LAG_TOTACC 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.21 
BIG4 0.96 1.00 0.20 0.95 1.00 0.22 0.96 1.00 0.19 1.71** 
MERGER 0.06 0.00 0.24 0.07 0.00 0.25 0.05 0.00 0.22 1.55 
LITIGATION 0.21 0.00 0.41 0.25 0.00 0.43 0.19 0.00 0.37 4.63*** 
ACEXP 0.71 1.00 0.46 0.71 1.00 0.46 0.71 1.00 0.45 0.20 
ENV_IN 0.13 0.00 0.40 0.11 0.00 0.38 0.14 0.00 0.42 1.39* 
***, **, * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.  See Table 14 for variable definitions.   
bTest results are identical when I use non-parametric tests. 
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Table 16 
Essay Three Pearson and Spearman Correlations 
Correlations: Pearson (Spearman) Correlations are Presented in the Upper (Lower) Diagonala 
 LN_ MVE LEV MKTBK LOSS OCF 
LAG_ 
TOTACC BIG4 MERGER LITIGATION ACEXP ENV_IN 
LN_MVE  0.097 0.166 -0.205 -0.028 0.004 0.015 0.013 -0.030 0.006 0.007 
LEV 0.104  -0.506 0.036 -0.020 0.037 0.026 0.010 -0.009 0.024 -0.080 
MKTBK 0.105 -0.639  0.006 -0.006 -0.015 0.002 -0.016 -0.015 -0.008 0.028 
LOSS -0.212 0.033 -0.034  -0.055 0.033 0.008 -0.026 0.027 0.003 0.007 
OCF -0.018 0.003 -0.020 -0.044  0.147 0.004 0.047 -0.141 0.030 -0.016 
LAG_TOTACC 0.018 0.038 -0.016 0.021 -0.064  0.024 0.005 -0.014 0.001 0.018 
BIG4 0.011 0.024 0.005 0.008 0.011 0.059  0.043 -0.026 0.014 0.026 
MERGER 0.012 0.011 -0.042 -0.026 0.041 -0.033 0.043  0.021 0.011 -0.045 
LITIGATION -0.019 -0.002 -0.003 0.027 -0.059 -0.027 -0.026 0.021  
-0.009 -0.030 
ACEXP -0.004 0.022 -0.019 0.003 0.022 0013 0.014 0.011 -0.009  -0.029 
ENV_IN 0.014 -0.084 0.048 -0.005 -0.041 0.081 0.039 -0.046 -0.034 -0.041  
aCorrelations significant at the two-tailed 0.05 level are in bold figures.  See Table 14 for variable definitions. 
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Table 17  
Regression of Absolute Value of Discretionary Accruals on Environmental Initiatives 
 
AB_DACC =  f { LN_MVE, LEV, MKTBK, LOSS, OCF, LAG_TOTACC, BIG4, MERGER,  
      LITIGATION, ACEXP, ENV_IN, YEAR FIXED EFFECTS, INDUSTRY } 
 
Variable Expected Sign Estimate          t-statistic  
Intercept  0.047 1.308  
LN_MVE ? 0.002 1.331  
LEV ? -0.023 -2.077**  
MKTBK + 0.002 0.797  
LOSS + 0.012 1.719** 
OCF - -0.102 -4.792***  
LAG_TOTACC - -5.181 -1.502*  
BIG4 - 0.000 -0.026  
MERGER ? 0.006 0.664 
LITIGATION + 0.021 3.284***  
ACEXP - 0.000 -0.041 
ENV_IN - -0.012 -2.224**  
YEAR FIXED 
EFFECTS 
 yes           
INDUSTRY  yes            
     
Observations 2,095    
Adjusted R2/F-value 0.10  11.091***  
VIF Range 1.021 – 1.536    
***, **, * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 levels, respectively.  The t-statistics are based on 
White’s (1980) adjusted standard errors. See Table 14 for variable definitions. 
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Table 18  
Regression of Income-Increasing Discretionary Accruals on Environmental Initiatives 
 
INC_DACC =  f { LN_MVE, LEV, MKTBK, LOSS, OCF, LAG_TOTACC, BIG4, MERGER,  
            LITIGATION, ACEXP, ENV_IN, YEAR FIXED EFFECTS, INDUSTRY } 
 
Variable Expected Sign Estimate          t-statistic  
Intercept  0.061 0.993  
LN_MVE ? 0.002 0.654 
LEV ? -0.033 -1.719*  
MKTBK + 0.003 0.732  
LOSS + 0.022 1.861**  
OCF - -0.195 -5.406***  
LAG_TOTACC - -20.606 -3.822***  
BIG4 - 0.004 0.246  
MERGER ? -0.017 -1.041 
LITIGATION + 0.029 2.600*** 
ACEXP - 0.003 0.377  
ENV_IN - -0.015 -1.497*  
YEAR FIXED 
EFFECTS 
 yes             
INDUSTRY  yes             
     
Observations 927    
Adjusted R2/F-value 0.13  7.355***  
VIF Range 1.038 – 1.502    
***, **, * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 levels, respectively.  The t-statistics are based on 
White’s (1980) adjusted standard errors. See Table 14 for variable definitions. 
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Table 19  
Regression of Absolute Value of Discretionary Accruals on Environmental Initiative Indicator 
 
AB_DACC =  f { LN_MVE, LEV, MKTBK, LOSS, OCF, LAG_TOTACC, BIG4, MERGER,  
            LITIGATION, ACEXP, ENV_YN, YEAR FIXED EFFECTS, INDUSTRY } 
 
Variable Expected Sign Estimate          t-statistic  
Intercept  0.034 0.940  
LN_MVE ? 0.002 1.328  
LEV ? -0.023 -2.089**  
MKTBK + 0.002 0.814 
LOSS + 0.012 1.699**  
OCF - -0.101 -4.785***  
LAG_TOTACC - -5.153 -1.494*  
BIG4 - 0.000 0.039  
MERGER ? 0.006 0.727  
LITIGATION + 0.021 3.316*** 
ACEXP - 0.000 -0.067 
ENV_YN - -0.016 -2.332***  
YEAR FIXED 
EFFECTS 
 yes              
INDUSTRY  yes               
     
Observations 2,095    
Adjusted R2/F-value 0.10  11.116***  
VIF Range 1.020 – 1.537    
***, **, * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 levels, respectively.  The t-statistics are based on 
White’s (1980) adjusted standard errors. See Table 14 for variable definitions. 
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Table 20  
Regression of Income-Increasing Discretionary Accruals on Environmental Initiative Indicator 
 
INC_DACC =  f { LN_MVE, LEV, MKTBK, LOSS, OCF, LAG_TOTACC, BIG4, MERGER,  
            LITIGATION, ACEXP, ENV_YN, YEAR FIXED EFFECTS, INDUSTRY } 
 
Variable Expected Sign Estimate          t-statistic  
Intercept  0.060 0.976  
LN_MVE ? 0.002 0.658 
LEV ? -0.033 -1.728* 
MKTBK + 0.003 0.762 
LOSS + 0.021 1.829**  
OCF - -0.194 -5.413***  
LAG_TOTACC - -20.625 -3.826***  
BIG4 - 0.005 0.321  
MERGER ? -0.017 -1.023  
LITIGATION + 0.029 2.666***  
ACEXP - 0.003 0.370  
ENV_YN - -0.019 -1.589*  
YEAR FIXED 
EFFECTS 
 yes              
INDUSTRY  yes              
     
Observations 927    
Adjusted R2/F-value 0.13  7.370***  
VIF Range 1.038 – 1.502    
***, **, * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 levels, respectively.  The t-statistics are based on 
White’s (1980) adjusted standard errors. See Table 14 for variable definitions.. 
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Table 21 
Regression of Absolute Value of Discretionary Accruals on Types of Environmental Initiatives 
 
AB_DACC =  f { LN_MVE, LEV, MKTBK, LOSS, OCF, LAG_TOTACC, BIG4, MERGER,  
       LITIGATION, ACEXP, PROD_SERV, POLL_PREV, RECYCLE, CLIMATE,  
       OTHER, YEAR FIXED EFFECTS, INDUSTRY } 
 
Variable Expected Sign Estimate          t-statistic  
Intercept  0.046 1.279  
LN_MVE ? 0.002 1.325  
LEV ? -0.023 -2.082**  
MKTBK + 0.002 0.817  
LOSS + 0.012 1.741**  
OCF - -0.100 -4.728***  
LAG_TOTACC - -4.964 -1.438*  
BIG4 - 0.000 0.015  
MERGER ? 0.006 0.694  
LITIGATION + 0.020 3.219*** 
ACEXP - 0.000 0.044  
PROD_SERV - 0.010 0.814  
POLL_PREV - -0.033 -2.256**  
RECYCLE - -0.009 -0.522  
CLIMATE - -0.019 -1.635**  
OTHER - 0.001 0.042  
YEAR FIXED 
EFFECTS 
 yes              
INDUSTRY  yes              
     
Observations 2,095    
Adjusted R2/F-value 0.10  9.627***  
VIF Range 1.022 – 1.538    
***, **, * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 levels, respectively.  The t-statistics are based on 
White’s (1980) adjusted standard errors. See Table 14 for variable definitions. 
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Table 22  
Regression of Income-Increasing Discretionary Accruals on Types of Environmental Initiatives 
 
INC_DACC =  f { LN_MVE, LEV, MKTBK, LOSS, OCF, LAG_TOTACC, BIG4, MERGER,  
       LITIGATION, ACEXP, PROD_SERV, POLL_PREV, RECYCLE, CLIMATE,  
       OTHER, YEAR FIXED EFFECTS, INDUSTRY } 
 
Variable Expected Sign Estimate          t-statistic  
Intercept  0.058 0.949  
LN_MVE ? 0.002 0.648  
LEV ? -0.034 -1.775*  
MKTBK + 0.003 0.730  
LOSS + 0.021 1.817**  
OCF - -0.188 -5.218***  
LAG_TOTACC - -20.179 -3.740***  
BIG4 - 0.006 0.365  
MERGER ? -0.018 -1.062  
LITIGATION + 0.027 2.415***  
ACEXP - 0.004 0.459  
PROD_SERV - 0.022 0.970  
POLL_PREV - -0.042 -1.673**  
RECYCLE - -0.006 -0.178  
CLIMATE - -0.025 -1.146  
OTHER - 0.003 0.094  
YEAR FIXED 
EFFECTS 
 yes               
INDUSTRY  yes              
     
Observations 927    
Adjusted R2/F-value 0.13  6.390***  
VIF Range 1.039 – 1.507    
***, **, * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 levels, respectively.  The t-statistics are based on 
White’s (1980) adjusted standard errors. See Table 14 for variable definitions. 
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APPENDIX: EXAMPLES OF ENVIRONMENTAL INITIATIVES 
Initiative Type Company Example 
Environmental 
Products and Services 
(PROD_SERV) 
Waters 
Corporation 
The Company’s Waters instruments (LC and MS) are utilized in this broad range of industries to detect, 
identify, monitor and measure the chemical, physical and biological composition of materials as well as 
to purify a full range of compounds. These instruments are used in drug discovery and development, 
including clinical trial testing, the analysis of proteins in disease processes (known as “proteomics”), 
food safety analysis and environmental testing (Waters Corporation 2006). 
Pollution Prevention 
(POLL_PREV) 
3M 
Company 
Capital expenditures for environmental purposes have included pollution control devices — such as 
wastewater treatment plant improvements, scrubbers, containment structures, solvent recovery units 
and thermal oxidizers — at new and existing facilities constructed or upgraded in the normal course of 
business. Consistent with the Company’s policies stressing environmental responsibility, capital 
expenditures… for known projects are presently expected to be about $20 million over the next two 
years for new or expanded programs to build facilities or modify manufacturing processes to minimize 
waste and reduce emissions (3M Company 2006). 
Recycling Initiatives 
(RECYCLE) 
Trex 
Company, 
Inc. 
Through capital investments and process engineering, I continuously seek to lower the all-in cost to 
manufacture Trex products. Investments in plastic recycling capabilities will allow us to expand my 
ability to use a wider breadth of waste streams and as a result lower my raw material costs (Trex 
Company, Inc. 2006). 
Climate Protection 
(CLIMATE) 
FPL Group, 
Inc. 
As a participant in President Bush's Climate Leader Program to reduce greenhouse gas intensity in the 
United States by 18% by 2012, FPL Group has inventoried its greenhouse gas emission rates and has 
committed to a 2008 reduction target of 18% below a 2001 baseline emission rate measured in pounds 
per megawatt-hour. FPL Group believes that the planned operation of its generating portfolio, along 
with its current efficiency initiatives, greenhouse gas management efforts and increased use of 
renewable energy, will allow it to achieve this target. In addition, FPL Group has joined the U.S. 
Climate Action Partnership, an alliance made up of a diverse group of U.S.-based businesses and 
environmental organizations, which in early 2007 issued a set of principles and recommendations to 
address global climate change and the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions (FPL Group, Inc. 2006). 
Other 
Environmentally 
Proactive Initiatives 
(OTHER) 
The Dow 
Chemical 
Company 
Dow is committed to world-class environmental, health and safety ("EH&S") performance, as 
demonstrated by a long-standing commitment to Responsible Care®, the significant progress made by 
the Company over a 10-year period toward Dow's EH&S Goals for 2005, and the development of 
Dow's new 2015 Sustainability Goals. In 2005, Dow developed its next generation of 10-year goals that 
will provide continuity to the first set of goals, while also addressing a broader set of challenges. The 
2015 Sustainability Goals will set the standard for sustainability in the chemical industry by focusing 
on improvements in Dow's local corporate citizenship and product stewardship, and by actively 
pursuing methods to reduce the Company's environmental impact (The Dow Chemical Company 2006). 
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